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CHAPTER I 
FLORIDA, OBJECT OF DESIRE 
DUring the period from 1797 to 1819 the united states gov-
ernment bad endeavored to buy the Floridas. Reasons tor our 
eagerness to purchase were many. Some of our motives for the 
acquisition or this territory were justifiable, others were 
not. 
The rivers or Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi emptied 
into the Gulf or Mexico through Spanish territory. The early 
nineteenth century was a period when goods moved principally 
by water and naturally the American settlers desired to float 
their products to market on these rivers. An early historian 
wrote as follows: 
The territory was of great importance to 
the Americans, particularly on account or 
the waters ot the Mobile, the principal 
rivers of Alabama emptying themselves in-
to this bay, which is the natural outlet 
or an exceedingly fertile country or 
great extent.l 
Because the number of American settlers near these rivers 
increased :from year to year, John Adams was eager, and Thomas 
Jefferson even more so, to acquire the Floridas during their 
1 Theodore Ly.man, Jr., The Di~lomacy of the united States, 
Wells and Lilly, Boston, 18 8, I, 271. · 1 . 
2 
respective administrations. As tor the settlers who used the 
Mississippi as their principal means ot transportation, they 
could not endure that their wheat, tobacco, and other products 
should have value only through the tolerance ot the Spanish of-
ficials at the mouth or the river. Every Westerner and south-
erner looked to the military occupation ot New Orleans, Mobile, 
and Pensacola as an economic necessity to be achieved sooner 
or later. 
Then there was the Indian trade. 
At all times it (Spanish Florida) was 
viewed with alarm and covetousness be-
cause ot the activities and the trade 
possibilities or its native inhabit-
ants, an offshoot ot the LOwer creek 
Indians called the Seminoles. The 
Indian trade ot both provinces had 
been in large part controlled by Brit-
ish agents from the Bahamas since the 
British occupation or the Floridas 
ending in 1783.2 · 
The continual threat from the Indians and their sinister 
activities along the border demonstrated beyond a doubt that 
they really needed to be kept in check by a stronger hand than 
Spain could supply •. Since Spain could not live up to her obli-
gation, incurred in the Pinckney Treaty, ot keeping the red 
pacified, the intervention on the part ot the United States 
seemed inevitable to settle the disputes between the Indians 
2 dams-
and the frontier settlers of Georgia. Against Spaniards and 
Indians, Western settlers had loose notions or law. Their 
fixed purpose was to expel both groups. 
3 
FUrther reason for continual dissatisfaction lay in the 
problem of fugitive slaves who escaped from the southern regions 
into East Florida to swell the number of lawless groups living 
there. In 1?97 an agreement was reached between Enrique White, 
the Spanish Governor of Florida, and the officials ot the 
United States by which these fugitives were to be returned. 
Because this agreement was not regularly enforced, the number 
of fUgitives increased steadily. 
Another major issue was involved in the problem of 
Florida. It had to do with claims or the United States against 
Spatn.3 These claims r~sted upon: 
1. the depredations committed by Spanish cruisers 
on American neutral shipping in violation or the 
articles of Pinckney's Treaty or 1?95 during the 
years 179? to 1801; 
2. the depredations by French cruisers and French 
prize courts within the jurisdiction ot Spain for 
which the United States tried to hold Spain re-
sponsible; · 
3. damage sustained by United States citizens as a 
result or the suspension of the right or deposit 
at New Orleans 1n 1802. 
The claims of the United States government against Spain 
represented about one hundred twenty~tive vessels and cargoes, 
3 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 433. 
at a valuation from five to eight million dollars; those 
against France amounted to about the same. 4 Many or these 
claims had been settled in the convention or August 11, 1802, 
which was concluded 
between His Catholic Majesty and the 
United States ot America tor the indem-
nification or those who have sustained 
losses, damages or injuries in conse-
quence of the excesses or individuals 
ot either nations during the late war, 
contrary to the exist5ing treaty, or the laws of nations. 
Although this convention was ratified by the United 
states, it had never been accepted by Spain. Therefore the 
claims were still a bone of contention in 1817. 
4 
A further reason tor our eagerness to acquire Florida lay 
in our tear ot British intrigue or British occupation, James 
Madison, secretary of state, voiced this mistrust of England 
when he wrote to James Monroe on July 29, 1802: 
Should Spain be engaged in the war, it 
cannot be doubted that they [the Flori-
das) will be quickly occupied by a Brit-
ish force, and held out on some condi-
tion or other to the United states. · 
Should Spain be still at peace and wish 
not to lose her neutrality, she should 
4 Charles E. Hill, "James Madison," The American Secretaries 
ot State and iheir DiplomacY, •dited by Samuel F. Bemis, 
A. A. tnop?, ew fori, l.t., 1927, III, 48, 
An interesting list or the names ot these French and Span-
ish vessels, ot their owners, their description and eval-
5 uation is to be round in A.S.P., F.R., II, 446-458. 
A,S,P,, F ,R,, II, 475. 
reflect that the facility and policy or 
seizing the Floridas must strengthen 
the temptation of Great Britain to force . 
her into the war. In every view it will 
be better tor Spain that the Floridas 
should be in the hands of the6United States than or Great Britain. 
More important than all ot these reasons, in tact, one ot 
the principal points after 1815 on which all negotiations tor 
the cession or the Floridas hinged, was that ot the western 
boundary between Spanish and American territories. Spain at no 
time after 1815 would consider settling only the problem con-
cerning the Floridas. 
To understand the questions involved in the controversy 
over Florida, its earlier history ·and also that ot the Purchase 
ot LOuisiana must be recalled to mind, During the seventeenth 
century and up to 1763 in the eighteenth century, France claim 
possession ot all the land drained by the Mississippi River, 
while Spain held Florida, together with her other North and 
south American colonies. In the quarrels between these two 
mother countries during this period, Spain had to yield to 
France on the Gulf permitting the latter to colonize the re-
gions around Biloxi, Mobile, and New Orleans. After a petty 
war in 1718 and 1719, the boundary between their Gulf colonies 
was tacitly fixed as the perdido River. 
At the close or the seven Years• war, the Treaty or 1763 
6 A.S.P., F.R., II, 626, 
clearly defined English, French, and Spanish territories-in 
America. By this treaty, France surrendered to England: 
6 
Canada, Cape Breton, and all lands east of the Mississippi from 
the source of that river to the meeting of the Iberville with 
it. From that point the boundary line proceeded down the mid-
dle line of the Iberville River and of the Lakes Maurepas and 
Pontchartrain to the Gulf of Mexico. The river and port of 
Mobile were explicitly mentioned in the treaty. 
In order to reestablish peace • • • the 
Most Christian Ki.ng cedes ••• the river 
and port of the Mobile, and everything 
which he possesses on tne left side the 
river Mississippi ••• 7 
By the same treaty Spain surrend~red Florida to England 
with all territory east and southeast of the Mississippi in ex-
change for Cuba. A pathetic account regarding this transfer 
tells us that all the Spaniards in Florida at the time, about 
7,000 in number, left the country. 
It is said that the only Spaniards left, 
when the last transports weighed anchor, 
were three men who were in the woods try-
ing to find the last of their horses.8 
England was in possession of all Florida east of the Iber-
ville from 1763 to 1783. During this period she organized the 
7 "Extracts from the Treaty of Paris of 1763," American 
Histor Le f ets, A. Lovell and Company, New York, N.Y., 
v, 11. September 1892). 
8 Burton Barrs, East Florida in the American Revolution, 
Guild Press, Jacksonville, Florida, 1932, 2. 
7 
region into two governments - East and West Florida - with the 
Apalachicola River forming the boundary line between the two. 
• • • we have thought fit • • • to erect 
• • • tour • • • separate governments 
••• called by the names ot Quebec, East 
Florida, West Florida, and Grenada • • • • 
The government of East Florida, bounded 
to the westward by the Gulph or Mexico and 
the Apalachicola River; • • • • The GOv-
ernment or west Florida, bounded to the 
Southward by the Gulph of llexico includ-
ing all Islands within Six Leagues ot the 
coast, from the River Ap~lachicola to 
Lake Pontchartrain ••• ~ 
Loyalists from Georgia, carolina, and from farther north 
flocked to Florida during the American Revolution. There they 
organized themselves into regiments at st. Augustine, fought on 
the side of England throughout the war, and resisted success-
tully the American invasions into that region. 
9 
10 
It is interesting to speculate • • • 
what the effect upon Florida history 
would have been if one of the three in-
vasions by the American Continentals had 
succeeded in subjugating the province. 
It might have meant that the develop-
ment or this territory would have been 
advanced many years, because it is to be 
presumed that the American occupation 
would have been permanent. But the in-
vasions did not succeed, and Florida 
continued to be a pawn or the EUropean 
nations until Andrew Jackson's timeolO 
8 
At the close of the war Florida remained in British posses 
sion. The.influx of loyalists had augmented the population or 
East Florida to more than 17,000 people. These surely expected 
Great Britain to retain the Floridas. 
News that the Treaty of Paris provided 
for the cession of the colonies to Spain 
was a severe blow to the British Florid-
ians. • • • They pleaded and remonstra-
ted with the British Government in the 
most piteous terms1 _but to no avail. Slowly and painful~ the transfer was 
made. Only about 450 whites and 200 ne-
groes remained in Florida under the 
Spanish flag.ll 
Several thousand loyalists left for the regions near the 
Mississippi River, other thousands migrated to the United States 
while, still others dispersed to various places, such as the Ba-
hamas, Nova Scotia, 'and Jamaica. For a while citizens of the 
United States were prohibited from entering Florida as settlers 
by order or the Spanish court. 
In 1792 Florida was opened to a general 
emigration without exception or country 
or creed; and it was rapidly progressing 
• • • when the report of the Spanish 
Minister closed the gates against Amer-
ican citizens sometime about 1804 and2 virtually shut us in from the world.l 
The decline or the province was now certain. With immi-
gration from the United States cut orr and with a home govern-
11 Ibid., 40. 
12 Charles Vignoles, Observations Upon the Floridas, E. Bliss 
and E. White, Publishers, 128 Broadway, New York, N.Y., 
1823, 27. 
9 
ment exposed to the convulsions or Europe because or its prox-
imity to France, Florida was doomed to a precarious existence. 
Already in colonial days there had been rivalry between 
the American settlers and Spain, an antipathy inherited no 
doubt from Elizabethan England. The settlement of the caro-
linas and Georgia by English colonists served only to aggra-
vate this spirit. With the emergence or the new United states, 
relations between it and Spain were decidedly unpleasant. 
From the point or view or the United 
states this sick man had trom earliest 
colonial times been an uncommonly dis-
agreeable neighbor. With a zeal tor 
its own imperial interests which was 
entirely natural but was as naturally 
resented in the united states the Span-
ish government had withheld the recog-
nition or American Independence until 
its1secognition no longer mattered. 
• • 
Although the Treaty or San LOrenzo ot 1795 settled differ-
ences regarding the northern boundary or Florida and the right 
ot deposit in behalf of our western settlers at New Orleans, it 
did not end friction. Spain retained military posts at Natchez 
and in other places north or the 31° parallel until 1798 and 
then withdrew only under pressure. Then, ·too, Spanish orti-
eials in Louisiana intrigued with discontented settlers with 
the purpose of separating Kentucky and the West from the union. 
13 
10 
Although the admission of Kentucky as a state cheeked this sin-
ister type of activity, there were individuals, such as Gener 
James Wilkinson, who did not cease their treasonable relations 
with Spain. 
!he transfer or LOuisiana from Spain to France marked tor 
us the beginning of persistent efforts to purchase the Floridas 
Talleyrand at the close or the eighteenth century tried to re-
cover Louisiana tor France. The idea or its sale was not too 
displeasing to the Spanish Court for it was not especially 
eager to keep so troublesome a colony as this. It was inhabit-
ed mostly by aliens and was difficult to govern according to 
Spain's colonial system.l4 Talleyrand~instructions in 1798 to 
his minister at Madrid read in part as follows: 
"Let the court or Madrid cede these dis-
tricts (Florida and LOuisiana) to France, 
and from that moment the power of America 
is bounded by the limit which it may suit 
the interests and tranquility of France 
and Spain to assign her.nl5 
An agreement was reached by 1800 but no official notice ot 
the purchase treaty, the Treaty of San Ildefonso, was given to 
the United states. Spain sold Louisiana to France on condition 
that the latter would pledge herself not to alienate the 
14 Charles c. Griffin, The United States .and the Disruption of 
the Spanish EmPire 1816-1822, Columbia university Press, 
New York, N.Y., 1937, 18. 15 Henry Adams, Histor of the United tates of America, 
Charles Scribner's sons, New York, N.Y., 1 , I, 7. 
11 
property and usufruct of Louisiana and to return it to Spain 1n 
the event that 'the Duke of parma, (the new King of Etruria), 
should lose the whole or a part of his holdings. At this time 
Napoleon was also eager to buy Florida but the King of Spain 
expressed himself so strongly against the surrender of any por-
tion whatever of Florida that France had to yield in this re-
spect. Napoleon had offered Parma, Piacenza, and Guastella in 
exchange, but Manuel de Godoy, the Spanish minister, would not 
even permit the subject to be reopened. 
The bribe of parma and two other duchies 
had been held before the new King of Etru-
ria, if in return the King of SP~in would 
but annex Florida to LOuisiana.1b 
Godoy at this time was supported by the British ministry. 
Not only LOndon, but also Washington, would never have permitted 
France to have Florida. 
"The Pl'ince [Godoy) told me that the Brit-
ish minister had declared to him • • • 
that Bls Brittanic Majesty being informed 
of the projects of exchange which existed 
between France and Spain could never con-
sent that the two Floridas should become 
an acquisition of the Republic!· that the 
united States of America were n this re-
spect ot on! mind with the Court of Lon-
don ...... 7 
Jefferson did not even suspect such a thing as the transfe 
16 French E. Chadwick, The Relations of the United tates and 
~gain: Diplomacl, c ar es scribner's sons, New Yor , N.Y., 
1 9, $0. 
17 Henry Adams, I, 402. 
12 
of ownership or Louisiana to France when he began his adlll1n1-
stration, but rumors that Spain had ceded Louisiana, and per-
haps the Floridas, took shape in the United States about April 
1801. OUr new minister to France, Robert R. Livingston, was 
therefore instructed in Sep~ember of that 7ear to open nego-
tiations for the purchase of New Orleans and the Floridas from 
France, or through French influence. Very soon thereafter, 
Rufus King, United states )[inister at LOndon, sent to washing-
ton a copy of Lucien Bonaparte's Treaty of March 21, 1801. 
The fifth clause ot this treaty referred to the Treaty ot san 
Ildefonso, and removed all doubt of the cession or LOuisiana 
to France. Article V reads as follows: 
This treaty being in consequence or that 
already concluded between the First Con-
sul and His Kost Catholic Majesty by 
which the King cedes to France the pos-
session of LOuisiana, the contracting 
parties agree to carry the said treaty 
into execution, and to arrange it in con-
formity to their respective rights.l8 
There was some delay in the actual transfer of Louisiana 
to France by Spain due to Napoleon's unwillingness to meet the 
conditions of the Treaty of 1801 regarding the territory ceded 
to the Duke or parma in whose favor this exchange had been 
made. In the meantime Napoleon prepared an expeditionary 
18 A.S.P., ~., II, $12. 
13 
force which should first crush Toussaint L'OUverture at Santo 
Domingo and from there it was to go farther and occupy LOuisi-
ana. On December 31, 18~1, ·Livingston in Paris wrote to Rufus 
King: "• •• the armament destined, in the first instance, for 
Hispaniola, is to proceed to Louisiana, prov~ded Toussaint 
makes no opposition.ttl9 The resistance offered by the Negroes 
at santo Domingo, however, and the fever contracted there by 
the French soldiers, practically annihilated the armies sent 
out from France. This crushing defeat was a great determinant 
in the destiny ot the United States. 
At first Jefferson thought that the Floridas were included 
in the cession ot 1800 tor we find that he wrote on April 18, 
1802 to Livingston, saying: "The cession ot LOuisiana and the 
. 
Floridas by Spain to France works most sorely on the United 
States.tt20 In the same letter Jefferson told Livingston to 
take up the matter ot buying New Orleans and the Floridas from 
Napoleon. The intensity ot his desire to purchase these can be 
interred from the following: 
There is on the globe one single spot, 
the possessor ot which is our natural 
and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans 
• • • • France placing herself in that 
door assumes to us the attitude of de-
fiance. Spain might have retained it 
quietly tor years. • • • Not so can 
19 ~., LR·, II, 512. 
20 Tlie'Writings ot Thomas Jefferson, collected and edited by 
paul Leicester Ford, G.P.putnamls Sons, New York, N.Y., 
VIII, 144. 
it ever be in the hands of France ••• 
The day that France takes possession of 
N. Orleans fixes the sentence which is 
to restrain her tor ever within her low-
water mark. It seals the union of two 
nations who in conjunction can maintain 
exclusive possession or the ocean. From 
that moment we must marry ourselves to 
the British fleet and nation.21 
14 
By JUly 30, 1802, Livingston felt quite certain that the 
Floridas were not included in the cession to France tor he 
wrote to Madison that the Spanish ambassador at Paris had as-
sured him or this tact. 
While the Administration in washington watched the outcome 
ot the santo Domingo affair, a new cause tor friction between 
Spain and the United states arose in the west. The right of 
deposit, although originally guaranteed tor only three years 
was continued until 1802. Then, suddenly, on October 16, it 
was suspended by the Spanish Intendant at New Orleans, without 
his assigning another port, a stipulation made in the treaty 
tor such a contingency. In April 1803 Don casa Irujo, the Span· 
ish Minister at Philadelphia, came to the secretary of state to 
announce the re-establishment of the right or deposit.22 He 
claimed that the suspension had been an arbitrary act or the 
Intendant of the province of Louisiana. 
21 Ibid., 145. 
22 J05n Bassett Moore, Historbrifand Difest of the International 
Arbitrations to Which the ted S ates Has Been a Party, 
Government Printing Office, washington, D.c., 1898' V, 4493 
BY one of the curiosities of Spanish ad-
ministration the officials of the superior 
departments were independent of one an-
other, and apparently the governor was in 
nowise a party of the transaction• there 
seems little doubt that. the IntenAant was 
acting on his own motion, and it is more 
than likely, that foreseeing the almost 
certain transfer to France, he was merely 
desirous of acting as a marplot and of 
bringing between the united states and 
her new neighbor a burning question which 
might easily develop into flame.23 
15 
A considerable· number of congressmen wanted to seize New 
Orleans outright, but the moderate policy of Jefferson pre-
vailed. To appease the opposition and to evade this issue, he 
named James Konroe as Minister Extraordinary to help Livingston 
in buying New Orleans and Florida. For this territory the two 
commissioners could otter any amount up to $10,ooo,ooo. 
As she may be inclined to dispose of a 
part or parts • • • it is proper for you 
to know that the Floridas together are 
estimated at one fourth the value or the 
whole island ot New Orleans, and East 
Florida at half that or west Florida.24 
At the time of this communication, March 2, 1803, Jeffer-
son apparently believed that the Floridas had been included in 
the cession of LOuisiana to France after all. 
While Monroe was still JB route to paris in the spring or 
1803, and after the disasters at Santo Domingo, Napoleon 
decided to sell Louisiana to the united states. This move was 
23 chadwick, 51. 
24 A.S.P., ~., II, 544. 
16 
prompted by the fear that Great Britain would seize the terri-
tory as soon as the war which everyone knew was imminent be-
tween these powers would break out. 
On April 30, 1803, after hasty negotiations Livingston and 
Monroe acquired for the United States a vast unknown region to 
the west of the Mississippi instead of New Orleans and the 
Floridas which they had been instructed to buy. The purchase 
treaty refer!ed to the region defined in the Treaty of 1800, 
but it spoke of no specific boundaries. The American commis-
sioners insisted at first upon defining them, but their demands 
met with no success. Napoleon at this time was concealing a 
boundary which had been defined in his orders to Victor and 
La:q.ssat. "Victor was to command the forces of Louisiana; La. us-
sat was to be prefect, charged with the civil administration. 
Both received elaborate instructions; and although Victor could 
not sail without ships or troops, Laussat was sent on his 
way. n25 
Their instructions fix the boundaries of the territory 
which Victor was to receive from the Captain General of Cuba. 
They also quoted from the Treaty of Paris of 1763 by which 
Spain ceded Florida to Great Britain. Article VII of that 
treaty, as noted above, made the Iberville the eastern boundary 
25 Henry Adams, II, 5. 
17 
of Louisiana. C~ncerning these instructions, the American 
commissioners knew nothing and were told nothing. 
During the negotiations, Livingston 
••• had tried to insert in the treaty 
an article pledging the First Consul to 
use his good offices to obtain the Flor-
idas for the United States; and in his 
midnight dispatch to Madison, with the 
prospect of acquiring Louisiana before 
him, he had urged the advisability of 
exchanging this province for the more 
desirable Floridas.26 
Scarcely had the treaty been signed when a new possibil-
ity occurred to him. By emphasizing the old French boundary, 
the United States could claim a title to that part of Florida 
between the Iberville and the Perdido. The President and his 
Secretary of State were easily brought to the same conclusion 
through a "curious train of reasoning which a psychologist 
could describe only as the result of wishful thinking.n27 
Henry Adams deprecated this claim and wrote disparagingly of 
its author in his History of the United States of America: 
He (Livingston) did n~t assert that 
Spain had intended to retrocede Flor-
ida to France, or that France had claimed 
it as included in the retrocession. He 
26 Allen Johnson, "Jefferson and His Colleagues,•• The Age of 
Jefferson and Yarshall, (Volume IX of T e C ronicles of 
America Series, edited by Allen John-son , Yale University 
Press, New Haven, N.J., 1921, 89. 
27 Harold u. Faulkner, American Po itica an Soc al Histo 
F. S. Crofts and Company, New Yor, N.Y., 193 , 1 3. ' 
,.-· 
------------------------------------------------------, 
knew the contrary; and tried in vain to 
find someone will1ng to say that the 
country to the Perdido ought2to be in-cluded in the purchase • • • 8 
18 
We can also infer from a communication addressed to Robert 
Livingston by the Secretary or State how eager the Administra-
tion was to establish a state or certainty to their claim. 
It is not denied that the Perdido was 
once the eastern limit of Louisiana. It 
is not denied that the territory now pos-
sessed by Spain extends to the River Per-
dido. The river perdido, we s~, then, 
is the limit to the eastern extent2gf Lou-isiana ceded to the Ubited states. ~ 
A reliable historian of our own day points to recent re-
search which would make the claim of the united States much 
more reasonable than Henry Adams, Isaac J. cox, and others, 
concede. American statesmen would have had a strong argument 
if they 
28 
29 
30 
could have cited Spanish documents now 
available to show that west Florida after 
1783 actually had been reincorporated in-
to the jurisdiction ot LOuisiana • • • 
Spanish colonial authorities from 1783 to 
1803 did consider all or West Florida (ex-
cept that portion north of 31 degrees 
which had been recognised by Pinckney's 
Treaty ot 1797 within the united states) 
as a part of the jurisdiction or Louis1ana.30 
19 
It is obvious, of course, that documents discovered subse-
quent to their claim do not justify Livingston and others of 
tnat period who without having sufficient proof to substantiate 
their title insisted that Louisiana extended as far east as the 
Perdido. 
At first Spain was unwilling to recognize the title of the 
United States to Louisiana. She protested vehemently against 
the transfer of the province for the reason that Bonaparte had 
agreed never to alienate it to any other power. Don Casa Irujo 
tnen told his government tnat if it should continue to contest 
the American title and delay the delivery of Louisiana to Na-
poleon, the United States would not only take possession of it 
by force, but would also very likely seize the Floridas by way 
of compensation for the expenses incurred in the occupation of 
Louisiana. So in spite of her·reluctance Spain eventually de-
livered the province to France, well knowing that it was to be 
turned over immediately to the United States. 
Jefferson hoped that as soon as Spain was involved in the 
current European war he could persuade its government to recog-
nize the United States• title to West Florida. James Monroe, 
Minister at the Court of St. James, was sent to Madrid to as-
sist Charles Pinckney in pr·essing the whole subject of claims 
in a diplomatic bargain for the Floridas. However, tne passage 
of the Mobile Act in February 1804 did not help to smooth Mon-
roe•s path for him at the Spanish Court. This Act, passed at 
20 
the suggestion of the President, directed that the territories 
ceded to the United States by France in 1803, 
and also all the navigable waters, rivers, 
creeks, bays, and inlets .lying W1thin the 
United States, which emp!y into the Gulf 
or Mexico, east of the river Mississippi, 
shall be annexed to the Mississippi dis-
trict! and shalll together with the same, 
const tute one d stricti to be Cflled the 
"District of Mlssissipp " • • .J 
The Mobile Act furthermore gave the President power to 
erect there a separate customs district with a port of entry 
should the need for such a project arise. 
A few months later Jefferson established this region as a 
customs district. He was careful to select Fort Stoddart, lo-
cated north of 310 in indisputed American territory, as the 
port of entry. Irujo protested with great indignation against 
this appropriation of Spanish territory. Though Spain by this 
time was willing to recognize the title or the United States t 
Louisiana, she certainly was not willing to relinquish_her own 
title to West Florida. 
What aggravated Monroe's problem the more was the fact 
that Pinckney had been pressing for the ratification of the Oo 
vention or 1802 and had even gone so tar as to threaten war 
should Spain not ratify. The Senate had approved of this trea-
ty only after long deliberation. By the time it reached Spain, 
31 Laws or the United Rtates or A.aerica, R. e. Weightman, 
washington, D.c., 1 15, III, 571o 
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the stipulated period had expired. The King was greatly in-
censed besides by the Mobile Act, and as a result, "refUsed, 
as he had a perfect right to refuse, to ratify the conven-
tion.n32 It was under these circumstances that James Monroe 
began his delicate mission. He was charged with the task of 
persuading Spain to agree to a commission which should arbi-
trate other claims, to yield West Florida, and to accept 
$2,000,000 tor East Florida and that part of West Florida east 
of the Perdido. 
That the ·cession or this territory to the United States 
was necessary for the maintenance or peace was the principal 
argument. 
It is not from the want or territory, be-
cause it (Florida) is not known to be fer-
tile, and without it they have enough to 
satisfy their growing population for ages 
to come. It is, in truth, suggested more 
by a desire to remove all cause or a fu-
ture variance between them and Spain1 than 
or any immediate advantage to be derlved 
from it in other respects. , • • Situa-
ted in their interior, and detached from 
the other dominions or His catholic Maj-
esty, it is probable, to render it secure, 
that he would be compell~d to put a strong 
force there. Hence, the United States 
would be compelled to do the same, • • • 
It cannot be doubted that other powers 
would take a pleasure in seeing a rupture 
between the United States and Spain,j3 
32 Bemis, 183. 
33 A,S,P., ~., II, 637, 
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The Administration had quite overlooked the tact that 
Spain•s real mast·er was in Paris and at this time Napoleon was 
in no mood to make the slightest concessions in any direction. 
Thus this effort to persuade Spain to part with the Floridas 
proved just as abortive as previous attempts. Monroe then 
joined General Armstrong, united States envoy to France. From 
there they urged the President to seize Texas leaving west 
Florida alone tor the present. 
The President • • • lacked the resolution 
to employ force to take either Texas which 
he did not want but was entitled to or 
west Florida which he ardently desired but 
whose t'itle was in dispute.34 
Only in November ot the following year (1805) did the Pres 
!dent settle on a definite policy. Hearing that he might suc-
ceed in his desire it money were judiciously used at Paris, he 
decided, after consulting his Cabinet, to use Napoleon as an 
intermediary. He therefore drafted his annual message with 
the purpose ot inspiring Spain with tearo In secret session, 
however, he asked congress tor an appropriation ot $2,ooo,ooo 
to be used in facilitating the negotiation. 
Jefferson had already claimed that West 
Florida had once been bought in 1803 troa 
France and paid tor; if this claim were 
sound, he was now really proposing to buy 
34 Johnson, 96. 
it again and pay for it a second time, 
nominally to Spain, but really to France.35 
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However, the war party in Congress, under the leadership 
or John Randolph, angered by tbe contradictory messages36 from 
the President, fought this appropriation bill. By the time 
this group was outvoted (February 12, 1806), the opportunity 
for using Napoleon had been lost. 
In the end Jefferson's questionable tactics brought him 
nowhere. They only weakened his band with the British who now 
mistrusted both him and Napoleon, and they evoked the bitter 
hostility or Spain. Nevertheless Jefferson continued to hope 
that some day Florida would be incorporated into the Union. 
Bemis, 185. 
A ~omp11ation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 
17 9-1897, Government Printing Office, 1896-1900, compiled 
by James D. Richardson, 
December 3, 1805: With Spain our negotiations for a set-
tlement of difference have not had a satisfactory issue. • • 
On the Jlobile, our commerce passing through that river con-
tinues to be obstructed by arbitrary duties and vexatious 
searches. • • • Inroads have been recently made into the 
Territory of Orleans and the Mississippi, our citizens have 
been seized and their property plundered. • • and this by 
the regular officers and soldiers of that Government •••• 
Some of these injuries may perhaps admit a peaceable remedy 
• • • • But some of them are of a nature to be met by 
force only. I, 384, 385. 
December 6, 1805: Formal war is not necessary - it is not 
probable it will follow; but the protection of our citi-
zens, the spirit and honor of our country require that 
force should be interposed to a certain degree. It will 
probably contribute to advance the obje~t of peace. I, 390. 
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Then, in 1808, as a result of Napoleon's occupation of 
Spain, diplomatic relations were suspended between this country 
and the United States and they were not renewed until after the 
restoration of Ferdinand VII in 1814. After 1808 the United 
States was no longer tempted to bargain, tor a title to Florida 
given by Joseph Bonaparte could hardly be held adequate as long 
as the mastery or Europe was still doubtful. 
During this period of relaxation or Spanish authority the 
Spanish-American colonies began to rebel one after another 
against the mother country and this tact augmented not a little 
the strained relations existing between Spain and the United 
States. 
CHAPTER II 
FLORIDA., LAND OF DISORDERS 
The revolutionary movements of the Spanish-American colo-
nies against the mother country which broke out in 1809 and 
1810 spread rapidly and before long most of Spain 1 s vast Amer-
ican empire was in turmoil. Revolutions occurred also in the 
Floridas but their impetus was different from that of the other 
Spanish-American revolutions. 
Though foreign influence • • • had stimu-
lated a desire for political and economic 
change, the revolution in the Spanish-
American colonies was a native movement, 
and not subservient to any foreign power. 
The region bordering the United States 
was an exception to this rule for there 
the territorial ambitions of the United 
States and the hopes of foreign adventur-
ers were to be the dominant factors. In 
Florida, and to a certain extent in Texas, 
successive revolutionary movements must 
be considered as episodes in the expansion 
movement of the United States which led to 
the acquisition of Florida, to the exten-
sion of the boundary of the United States 
to the Pacific and which paved the way for 
the absorption of Texas in the following 
generation.l 
Jefferson bad predicted in 1791 that American immigration 
into the Floridas would result in the peaceful transfer of 
1 Griffin, 15. · 
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those regions to the United States. In 1810 the American-born 
inhabitants of West Florida were fulfilling this prophecy. In 
the section west of the Pearl River which contained five-sixths 
of the population of the province, nine-tenths of the people 
were Americans.2 This section was the Baton Rouge area. The 
other region was called the Mobile District. Spain had thus 
divided the administrative work of the territory west of the 
Perdido. 
Vicente Folch, Governor-General of the 
whole province of West Florida exercised 
the functions of government at Pensacola, 
while the immediate civil and military 
government at Baton Rouge was administered 
by Carlos Debault de Lassus. Under the 
vacillating administration of the latter, 
government was merely a name, laws were 
not enforced, smuggling was practiced 
without restraint and trial by jury·was 
unknown.3 
The overthrow of the Bourbon dynasty in Spain gave the 
inhabitants of the Baton Rouge area an opportunity to throw off 
the Spanish authority. With the connivance of the United 
States government and the assistance of American citizens, they 
declared themselves an independent state in September 1810 • 
2 
• • • it is probable tbat the rebels bad 
no desire to maintain their independence 
and that their motives were between a wish 
Julius w. Pratt, E~nsionists of 1812, The Macmillan Compan 
New York, N.Y., 192 , 75. 
3 Carolyn Hays Brevard, A His,ory of Florida From the Treaty 
of 1763 to OUr OWn Times, T e Florida State Historical 
Society, Deland, Fla., 1924, I, 27. 
to bring American occupation and hopes 
of securing titles to lands irregularly 
obtained.4 
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They then addressed a letter to the Secretary of State ask 
ing to be received under the protection of the United States 
Constitution. Accordingly, orders were sent to Governor Willia 
Claiborne to take possession of the Baton Rouge region and this 
occupation was accomplished without bloodshed. This section 
for the time being was incorporated with the Orleans Territory. 
Meanwhile Governor Folch of West Florida conscious of his 
inability to hold the entire province under prevailing condi-
tions,had offered to surrender it in case he were not reen-
forced by January 1, 1811. 
I have decided on delivering this prov-
ince to the United States. • • • The 
incomprehensible abandonment in which I 
see myself, and tb.e afflicted situation 
to wb.icb. this province sees itself re-
duced, not only authorize me, but force 
me to have recourse to this determina-
tion, the only one to sa~e it from the 
ruin which threatens it.' 
This offer, made before tb.e American occupation, was no 
doubt intended to forestall an extension of United States con-
trol to the rest of tb.e province. It was soon withdrawn and 
Folcb. protested vehemently6 wb.en on October 27, 1810, just 
about a month after tb.e Baton Rouge revolt, Madison issued a 
4 Griffin, 28. 
5 ~:' ~., III, 398, December 2, 1810, Folcb. to Robert 
6 Griffin, 29. 
,...-
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proclamation ordering the extension of American authority over 
West Florida to the Perdido River. The United States "actually 
took over an area only as far east as the Pearl (thus not inter 
fering with Spanish garrisons still left in Mobile and Pensa-
cola. )"7 
Madison's proclamation reads in part as follows: 
Whereas the territory south of the Mlssis-
ippi Territory and eastward of the river 
Mississippi, and extending to the river Per-
dido, of which possession was not delivered 
to the United States in pursuance of the 
treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of 
April, 1803, bas 1 at all times, as is well known been cons1dered and claimed by them, 
as belng within the colony of Louisiana con-
veyed by the said treaty in the same extent 
tbat it had in the hands of Spain, and that 
it had when France originally possessed it 
••• be it knOw.n, that I ••• have deemed 
it right • • • that possession shguld be 
taken of the said Territory ••• 
Since Madison acted on the theory that the territory west 
of the Perdido was acquired as part of the Louisiana Purchase, 
he concluded that no other action was necessary to legitimatize 
the occupation. Madison without doubt bad scruples concerning 
the justice of his claim to the title of West Florida. For 
wbat other reason would he say in the proclamation that the 
situation would "not cease to be a subject of fair and friendly 
negotiation and adjustment?" There is evidence that high 
7 Bemis, 186. 
8 A.S.P., F.R., III, 397. 
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ranking officials including Governor William Claiborne, and 
even the President himself, "were not only acquainted with the 
attempt to foment a revolutionary spirit in West Florida but ba 
actually authorized and assisted in the execution of such a de-
sign ••• "9 Madison even went so far as to falsify the dates 
of certain documents in October 1810 in order to make the part 
he played seem in keeping with the demands of justice.lO 
By the 3rd of January the President was prepared to take 
another step in the direction of the acquisition of Florida. 
He recommended to Congress that he be given the power to take 
possession of all or any part of Florida east of the Perdido 
should an emergency arise or with the consent of the Spanish 
authorities t~re. Congress thereupon in executive session 
gave the President this power. Armed with this authority he 
appointed two commissioners to treat with Governor Folch re-
garding the remaining portion of West Florida and all or any 
part of East Florida. These commissioners were Colonel McKee, 
an Indian agent, and General Matthews of Georgia, a Revolution-
ary veteran and an enthusiastic annexationist. By the time 
the commissioners reached their destination, Folch had recanted 
his offer. This proposal on the part of the Spanish Governor 
caused his recall to Spain but not before most of the province 
9 C. C. Tans ill! "Robert Smith," The American Secretaries of 
10 State aya The r DiplomacY, III, 186. Ibid., 1 4. 
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had been permanently lost. 
The strip in West Florida extending from the Mississippi 
to the Pearl River was added to Louisiana Territory on April 14 
1812, and on April 30 ot the same year that state entered the 
Union. A year later, on May 14, 1813, the rest of the strip, 
from the Pearl River to the Perdido, was added to Mississippi 
Territory, thus bringing Mobile within American control. Gover 
nor Holmes of Mississippi Territory did not attempt to enforce 
his jurisdiction in Jlobile itself. 
The Spanish clung tenaciously to the tort 
and town of Mobile and no attempt was made 
to dislodge them. Their occupancy, how-
ever, had no legal recognition of the 
United States.ll 
The Spaniards on their part made no further pretense of 
collecting duties. Their presence however within American ter-
ritory was a menace after the opening of the War of 1812. Eng-
land used the Mobile Bay district as a military base and there-
tore the United States took Mobile by force in April 1813. 
All the while Spain made vehement, but fruitless, protests 
to the United States against its action in West Florida. In 
England also Lord Liverpool, an important member of the Brit-
ish Cabinet, asserted that the Florida business should be 
11 Pratt, 75. 
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characterized as "one of the most immoral acts recorded 1n the 
history of any country.nl2 This remark can be understood when 
one considers the impotence of the various powers in Spain, 
who, struggling for supremacy at home, were unable to prevent 
this appropriation. 13 American historians too decry the man-
ner in which the United States acquired this section. We read, 
for instance 
12 
13 
The occupation of St. Francisville and of 
Baton Rouge established American jurisdic-
tion to the Pearl River. Later Claiborne 
extended our control to the Pascagoula, 
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic HistorY of tbe AmerieaB 
People, F. s. Crofts and Company, New York, N.Y., 194 , 
164. ' 
Note: The Spain of 1812 was in a most unusual position. 
Nominally, Napoleon was in control of both Spain and 
Portugal, but the United States did not recognize this 
occupation government. Charles IV bad abdicated as King 
of Spain; his son, Ferdinand VII, was recognized as King 
by all the American colonies. He was considered a limit-
ed, rather than an absolute, monarch by the Spanish Cor-
tes. This group 1 meeting as an underground government, 
announced a Cons~itution in 1812 and would not admit re-
presentatives from the colonies, thereby excluding dele-
gates from the Cuba-Plorida area. At this the colonists 
in the Americas declared themselves against the Cortes, 
and in favor of Ferdinand VII. Hence1 legally, there 
were two unrecognized governments in Bpain, Napoleon's 
and that of the Cortes. When we appropriated West Flor-
ida, we apparently took it from either or both of these, 
the latter supposition being absurd, or, we were taking 
it from Ferdinand VII, who was then practically Napoleon's 
prisoner. In 1814 when Ferdinand VII was again recognized 
as the legitimate sovereign, according to European and 
British procedure, all his powers and lands were restored. 
He bad claim then to all of East Florida and he bad equal 
right with the United States in the dispute over West 
Florida. 
and Wilkinson, by the military occupation 
of Mobile, to the Perdido. In this ruth-
less but expedient fashion our officials 
made good their plausible claim to this 
portion of West Florida which was later 
divided and annexed to three states of 
the American Union.l4 
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Regarding East Florida also there were intrigues of which 
the United States was cognizant, whose object it was to stir up 
insurrection. A rebellion in East Florida could give the Pres-
ident reason to intervene under the authority given him by the 
Act passed in January 1811. 
One such affair in 1812 was directed by the same General 
George Matthews who was to have been the agent for the transfer 
of Spanish Florida to the United States. When the realization 
of his hope was frustrated by the unwillingness of the Spanish 
Commander to relinquish his authority, Matthews devised other 
plans for the acquisition of that territory. 
By various ways he won a certain portion of the population 
to his side. The most important of his associates was J. H. 
Mcintosh who became one of the most conspicuous of the East 
Florida "patriots." With the permission of the government, 
General Matthews also succeeded in securing the presence of 
American military and naval forces. Although be disclosed his 
14 Isaac J. Cox, "The American Intervention 1n West Florida!" the American Historical Review, New York, N.Y., XVII, 31 , 
January 1912). 
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maneuvers to the officials in Washington, be received no orders 
to continue or to desist. Matthews therefore thought, and just 
ly so., tba t he had Monroe's tacit approval. 
. His first pretentious plans to take St. Augustine and to 
overthrow the Spanish government there failed because one Amer-
ican officer, Major Laval, discovered that his soldiers were 
not to be employed as soldiers, but "were to go as volunteers, 
leaving behind their characters as soldiers • • • but not their 
government muskets.nl5 Matthews then had to content himself 
with a less spectacular campaign which began with an attack on 
Fernandina. 
East Florida bad two important ports of entry. Fernandina 
on Amelia Island at the mouth of the St. Mary's River and Pen-
sacola on the Gulf' of Mexico. Amelia Island was known to be a 
notorious haunt for smugglers. Only ten Spaniards made up the 
garrison which was to preserve order on the island. In March 
1812, Matthews ordered the revolutionaries to take possession 
of' Amelia Island. These, then, according to plan, invited him 
to occupy Fernandina, which he did on March 18, 1812. From 
Fernandina the "pa triotstt set out in the direction of St. Au-
gustine. As they advanced, the United States troops .followed, 
immediately occupying the territory, always at the request of 
the revolutionaries just ahead of them. The success of his 
15 Pratt, 88. 
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mission seemed assured, but to the general's dismay came a dis-
patch disavowing his acts and revoking his commission. A publi 
cation contemporary with the period records the incident as fol 
lows: 
His taking possession of Amelia Island 
and other parts of East Florida was offi-
cially blamed, and his commission revoked 
in April, 1812, and the governor of Geor-
gia was commissioned in his place, in con-
sequence, as the official letter states, 
of general Matthews having employed the 
troops of the United States to dispossess 
the Spanish authorities. by force.lo 
Apparently the government was willing to countenance secre 
machinations to bring about the occupation, but.it was not eage 
' 
to be accused of using its army against a friendly power in sue 
a flagrant violation of international law. 
Furthermore, the publication just at this 
time of the Henry correspondence and the 
accompanying denunciation of Great Brit-
ain's suppos~d attempt to intrigue with 
citizens of the United States made it par-
ticularly inconvenient for the President 
and the Secretary of State to be caught 
supporting an intrigue of similar nature 
in the Spanish possessions.!? 
Senator Crawford of Georgia later declared that it was 
quite a general opinion in his section of the country that the 
Henry exposure was the sole reason for the failure of the Unit 
States government to support Matthews. From that time on, the 
i?6 Vigno1est 19. 
Pratt, 109. 
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General having been made the scapegoat of the affair, bore the 
administration a deep and ever-increasing resentment. 
This was not the time however to withdraw troops from such 
a strategic place as East Florida. Their continuance there was 
justified on the ground of protecting the "patriots" against 
the vengeance of Spain. The Chevalier Don Luis de Onis, the 
Spanish minister to the United States (not ye·t recognized as 
such in Washington) was instructed to inform Monroe that all 
residents of East Florida who had co-operated with the insur-
rection movement would be pardoned if they conducted themselves 
thereafter as loyal Spanish subjects. This announcement made 
the presence of American troops there unnecessary. At this 
moment came ~he n~ws of war with Great Britain. The occupation 
of the Spanish territory in Florida seemed again to be a neces-
sary measure, so the President sought authorization from Con-
gress. This body, however, though it was prepared to approve 
the military occupation of West Florida to the Perdido River, 
would not consent to the occupation of any territory east of 
that river. 
From 1808 to 1815 Florida was an issue not only in Spanisfr 
American relations, but also an Anglo-American problem. The 
settlers in the South and Southwest looked to the annexation of 
Florida as a political necessity. The northern states were 
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indifferent, although the West and Northwest looked with covet-
ous eyes on Canada. These designs on Florida and Canada helped 
to precipitate the war with England in 1812. 
The declaration of war at once brought to the United States 
government the tear of invasion from the Floridas. 
An English fleet, destined tor Savannah, 
lay ott Amelia Island for weeks, provi-
sioned from East Florida. Pensacola, the 
best harbor of them all, was selected as 
the base of British operations in the 
Gulf. Despite the protests of the Span-
iards, a British force under Colonel Ed-
ward Nicholls possessed itself of the 
forts in July 1813.1~ 
The War Department called tor volunteers and in February 
1813 three bodies of troops led by Andrew Jackson were ready to 
march into the Floridas if the need arose. The Senate however 
on February 12 authorized the seizure or only that region west 
of the Perdido, meaning simply Mobile, since at this time only 
that section was still 1n Spanish possession. Jackson's recall 
was to him a great disappointment. He and his men then awaited 
the next opportunity to renew the attack on Florida and that 
occasion was furnished them by the behavior of the Creek Indians 
in the Mississippi Territory. These bad been stirred up by Eng-
lish and Spanish agents from Florida, and also by Tecumseh, 
their great chieftain. In August 1813, the Creeks fell on Fort 
Mims, a fort inside the limits of the United States where 
18 Kathryn T. Abbey, Florida, Land of Cba.nge, The Uni ver si ty 
of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1941, 121. 
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several hundred pioneers had gathered for protection. 
A horrid massacre ensued lasting from noon 
until sunset. The main buildings of the 
fort were laid in ashes. Out of 500 per-
sons surprised in this slaughter, 400 were 
slain or roasted to death. Neither woman 
nor child was spared.l9 
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Governor Blount of Tennessee sent Andrew Jackson to oppose 
this double peril. Against great odds, Jackson made his way i~ 
to the enemy territory and in September 1813 won the opening 
skirmish by defeating an attack on Mobile. When winter came 
upon them, he could not get supplies and many of his men mu-
tinied. With only a handful of followers he held what he had 
won until reenforcements came. On March 27, 1814, he defeated 
the Indians decisively at Horseshoe Bend. 
By the Treaty of Fort Jackson of August 1814, the Creeks 
were forced to surrender two-thirds of their lands. Several 
million acres selected in a way so as to separate the Indian 
settlements of Alabama and Georgia were given over to Ameri-
cans. Unfortunately, many Creeks refused to recognize the 
treaty, fled south to Florida, where they awaited the restora-
tion of their lands as promised by Great Britain. 
The victorious Jackson then marched his men, on his own re-
sponsibility, to Pensacola in East Florida. He took this port 
on November 7, 1814,twenty-four hours after his arrival. With-
19 James Schouler, HistorY of the United States of America, 
Revised Edition, Dodd, Mead and Company, New York, N~Y., 
II, 433. 
in eight days be was back in Mobile, only to find awaiting him 
there instructions cautioning him against attacking Pensacola. 
Monroe had written October 21, 1814, warn-
ing Jackson against "measures which would 
involve this government in a contest with 
Spain." This was not received by Jackson 
until his expedition bad been accomplished, 
but had it been otherwise it is very sure 
that such an impetuous and headstrong char-
acter, whose only government was his own judgment, would have given such instruc-
tions no heed. And in this case he was en-
tirely in the right.20 
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Jackson justified his conduct on the ground that the Span-
ish officials had refused to surrender or to punish the C:reeks 
who had fled from his vengeance across the frontier. He claimed 
too that Nicholls organized Indian resistance to the United 
States and supplied the red man with weapons besides.21 
Popular support for his strong measures were not Lacking 
and twentieth-century historians still uphold him regarding 
this Pensacola affair. We read that 
• • • his capture of Pensacola was the 
best justified of all the series of aggres-
sions upon Spanish terri tory • • • .In the 
absence of any authority to do so, his ex-
pedition was in reality what it purported 
to be - an effort to enforce neutrality 
upon a station ~hich was being openly used 
by the British. 2 · 
In this manner the occupation of West Florida by the 
2
2
0
1 
Cbadwick, 117. 
Brevard, I, 32. 
22 Pratt, 248. 
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United States was made permanent as far east as the Perdido. 
River. ladison bad hoped to carry the nation's claims before 
the negotiators at Ghent. Instructions were issued to Albert 
Gallatin on the eve of his departure for Europe to participate 
1n the negotiations to bring this issue before the commissioners 
assembled there. These instructions reminded him of the Act of 
January 1811 by which the President was given power to take pos-
session of East Florida in the event that any attempt should be 
made by a foreign power to occupy it. He was to reiterate that 
West Florida as far east as the Perdido was ours by cession and 
occupation and that we now bad a just claim on East Florida as 
indemnity for spoliations. 
• • • but in Gallatin Monroe found a man 
who not only shared the general northern 
dislike for the Florida scheme, but who 
was earnestly fearful of the disruptive 
effect its prosecution might have upon 
country and party, and who saw, further-
more, that a policy of unscrupulous ag-
gression against Spain might conceivably 
cost the United States the good offices 
of the Czar, upon which the success of 
the mission was thought to turn.23 
Both East and West Florida had been battlegrounds during 
the War of 1812. The people of our southern states had looked 
forward to the annexation of the eastern province, but when 
the war actually ended, East Florida was still in Spain's 
23 ll!!£.' 236. 
~· 
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possession. 
Immediately after the war there were frequent rumors of the 
cession of the province by Spain to Great Britain. Periodicals 
carried such notices from time to time. One of them which ap-
peared in Niles• Weekly Register reads as follows: 
It seems a matter of certainty that the 
Floridas have been ceded to Great Britain 
and we are sorry for it; for we can see in 
the possession of them by that power noth-
ing else than a preparation for a new quar-
rel with the United States •••• 24 
In London, too, items of a like nature appeared in their 
' 
publications. On September 24, 1815, the following article ap-
peared in the London Morning Cnronicle: 
The question of indemnity which England 
demands for the efforts which she made in 
the war with Spain, bas terminated, after 
long discussions, by the cession of the 
two Floridas, east and west. But this 
tongue of land has no real value at the 
moment? it offers only sandy deserts and 
unhealthy coasts.25 
It was even reported that there was an expedition in prep-
aration to be sent out from Great Britain to take possession of 
it. The intimations along these lines were seemingly so author-
itative that John Quincy Adams who at the time was United States 
Minister at the Court of St. James was finally told to bring the 
matter to the attention of the British government. Castlereagh 
24 Jiles• Wee~ Re3*ster, Baltimore, Md., IX, 214, 
ovember 1 , 181 }. 
25 !R1£., IX, 197. 
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assured him in February 1816 that there was no foundation for 
the reports. 
26 
Military positions may have been taken by 
us during the war of places which you had 
previously taken from Spain, but we never 
intended to keep them. Do you observe the 
same moderation. If we shall find you 
hereafter pursuing -a system of encroach-
ment upon your neighbors, what we might do 
defensively is another consideration.26 
Joseph B. Lockey, Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings, 
The Macmillan Company, New York, N.Y., 1920, I, 271. 
CHAPTER III 
FLORIDA, A WEAPON IN THE HANDS OF SPAIN 
John Quincy Adams, writing to his father on August 1, 1816, 
remarked: 
All the restored governments of Europe are 
deeply hostile to us. • • • Wherever Brit-
ish influence extends it is busy to black-
en us in every possible manner. In Spain 
the popular feeling is almost as keen 
against us as in England.l 
Of all the European powers it was particularly Spain that 
continued to remain in strained relations with the United States 
and this tension emanated from two main sources: the Florida 
problem with all its complications, and the revolutions in the 
Spanish-American colonies. 
Although the spirit of revolt which af-
flicted the other colonies of Spain in 
America from 1810 to 1820 did not reach 
East Florida, the attitude of the United 
States to the rebelling provinces was 
offensive to Spain and in the end proved 
a serious obstacle to the acquisition of 
Florida.2 
1 Writings of John Quincy Adams, edited by Worthington c. Ford, 
Tbe Macmillan Company, New York, N.Y., 1916, VI, 61. 
2 Kendrick c. Babcock, The Rise of American Nationality 1811-
lal2, (Volume XIII of The American Nation Series, edited 
~. B. Bart), Harper and Brothers, New York, N.Y., 1909, 
273. 
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The possession of Florida was an excellent weapon in the 
hands of Spain against our open recognition of the Spanish-Amer-
ican colonies. If during the American Revolution Florida had 
been the bait held out by France to entice Spanish aid to the 
American cause, the indications now were that Florida was again 
being used, this time by Spain, to prevent the United States 
from sympathizing with or buying from these colonies. 
While the representative of Spain talked 
of an impossible alliance and sought vain-
ly to obtain some form of restraining de-
claration or promise by the United States 
in regard to her future attitude toward 
the Spanish possessions • • • no such 
promise could possibly be made by this 
government which was already consider-
ing recognition of the rule at Buenos 
Aires where independence bad been declared 
on July 9, 1816.j 
During the months that followed Spain's chances were by no 
means hopeless and therefore the administration in Washington, 
supported by many of the most influential newspapers of the 
East, fought against the recognition resolution then before the 
House. The principal proponent for this measure was Henry Clay. 
3 
To the typically American mind of Henry 
Clay now untrammeled by any sense of re-
sponsibility, for he was a free lance in 
the House of Representatives once more, 
the emancipation of South America was a 
thrilling and sublime spectacle - "the 
Other Inte national Ac 
edited by D. Hunter 
States 
glorious spectacle of eighteen millions 
of people struggling·to burst their chains 
and to be tree."4 · 
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He maintained that recognition was not a breach or neutral 
ity tor it did not involve material aid given to the revolution 
ists, but only our moral sympathy. His enthusiasm at this time 
was quite inopportune since the Department or State was at the 
same time negotiating for the cession of Florida. Henry Clay 
nevertheless continued to urge the cause of independence for 
the insurgents. The issue became so acute that when the matter 
came up for a vote, sick members were carried into the Hause or 
Representatives to cast their ballot. The resolution was de-
feated on March 30, 1818 with a count of 115 to 45. 
John Quincy Adams, who directed the attitude of the gov-
ernment to a considerable extent during Monroe's administration 
would not bave the United States deviate in the least from the 
path of strict neutrality until orderly governments there were . 
achieved and fundamental civil rights were respected. The 
United States looked upon Spain and her revolting colonies as 
belligerents 1n a civil war. Besides the proclamation of neu-
trality issued in 1815, a Neutrality Act of March 3, 1817 pro-
hibited the fitting out of expeditions in the United States to 
fight powers with which this country was at peace, and an Act 
of April 20, 1818 prohibited all American citizens from accept-
4 Johnson, 287. 
ing or exercising any commission within their country to serve 
any group against a country with which the United States was at 
peace. 
It was all too true though that in spite or the passage or 
these laws, they were difficult to enforce. In his Memoirs 
John Quincy Adams complained bitterly or conditions in Balti-
more: 
They are all fanatics or the South American 
cause. Skinner, the postmaster, has been 
indicted for being concerned in the pirati-
cal privateers. Glenn, the district attor-
ney, besides being a weak incompetent man, 
has a son said to be concerned in the pri-
vateers, The district judge, Houston, and 
the circuit judge, Duval, are both feeble, 
inefficient men over whom William Pinckney, 
employed by all the pirates as their coun-
sel, domineers like a slave driver over 
his negroes.5 
Even President Monroe went so far as to express sentiments 
or sympathy for the revolutionists in every message to Congress, 
at the same time declaring United States neutrality. As tor 
John Quincy Adams' personal convictions, we find that in spite 
ot his public utterances or neutrality, he felt that the South 
American cause was just. On August 24, 1818 he wrote as fol-
lows to the President: 
There is a stage in such contests when 
the party struggling for independence 
have, as I conceive, a right to demand 
5 Memoirs or John Quincy Adams, edited by Charles F. Adams, 
J. P. Lippincott and Company, Philadelphia, Pa., 1874, 
IV, 318. . 
its acknowledgment by neutral parties, and 
when the acknowledgment may be granted with-
out departure from the obligations of neu-
trality. It is the stage when the independ-
ence is established as a matter of fact, so 
as to leave the chance of the opposite party 
to recover their dominion utterly desparate.6 
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Great Britain was anxiously hoping for the success of the 
revolutions since she coveted the raw produce of these colonies 
and was in a position to offer a wide variety of manufactured 
goods in return. Restoration of Spanish authority would mean at 
least a partial revival of economic monopolies. Accordingly, 
England's position was difficult. She was an ally of Spain, and 
therefore could not be too open in aiding these revolutions. 
England also feared Ame~ican expansion southward. 
To retard American ambitions in the south 
was ••• one of England's objectives, 
which she attempted to promote by sustain-
ing Spain in her efforts to retain Florida 
and by organizing Indian alliances along 
the frontier."/ 
She did not realize at that time that our ambitions lay 
westward once we had possessed ourselves of the Floridas. She 
did not know either that Americans had little inclination to 
take a band in Pan-American events beyond reducing European im-
perialistic exploitation there. 
As for Spain, every soldier she could spare to send across 
the Atlantic was needed in the attempt to hold her colonies. 
6
7 
Writings of John Quincy Adams, IV, 442. 
Abbey, 123. 
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Florida was one of the few that did not rebel, so troops were 
withdrawn which left the Spanish officials there quite helpless. 
By this time the hold of the Spaniards on Florida was so weak-
ened that they occupied only three important points: Pensacola, 
St. Marks, and St. Augustine. The rest of the territory·was a 
No Man's Land and an ideal resort for desperate adventurers of 
every race and description. As a result the situation on the 
frontier between Georgia and Florida became more and more diffi-
cult. 
About 1816 Colonel Edward Nicholls proclaimed an ''alliancen 
between England and Spain, demanding at the same time the eva-
cuation of the Creek lands. He built a fort on the Apalachicola 
River and gathered around him Seminole and Creek allies. On his 
return to England his conduct was there disavowed. 
Nicholls' abandoned fort became a place of rendezvous for 
runaway Negroes who were evidently allies of the Indians. These 
raided the countryside, plundered where they could, and attacked 
the boats going up and down tne river. The Spanish governor did 
nothing to check this brigandry, but the Uhited States could not 
allow these depredations. to continue. On July 27, 1816, when 
the outlaws of Negro Fort, as it was then called, attacked an 
American boat crew, the Americans opened fire. They burnt the 
8 Mac-
fort by firing a red bot cannon ball into its midst. Explosion 
of the magazine created a burning inferno and all within were 
trapped. Nearly three hundred victims perished in this attack. 
And for a while all was quiet on the Apalachicola front. 
In 1817 Amelia Island and Galveston, Texas, were nominally 
in the bands or revolutionists, but really in the control of law 
less adventurers like Gregor MacGregor who smuggled slaves into 
the United States and carried on other freebooting enterprises. 
This pirate was soon succeeded by General 
Aury, who had enjoyed a wild career among 
the buccaneers of Galveston Bay, where be 
bad posed as military governor under the 
Republic of Mexico. East Florida in the 
bands or such desperadoes was a menace to 
the American border.9 
Acting under the resolution of January 1811 which empow-
ered the President to act in such a contingency, President Mon-
roe ordered that these irregular establishments be suppressed at 
once, a step to which the Secretary of State gave hearty support 
Naval vessels sailed at once to execute these orders; early in 
the year of 1818 Monroe was able to .announce that Amelia Island 
and Galveston had been yielded up without bloodshed. In his 
message of January 13, 1818 to Congress the President said in 
part: 
By the suppression of this establishment 
and that at Galveztown ••• there is good 
cause to believe that the consummation of 
9 Johnson, 274. 
~·.----------------------------------~ 
a project fraught with injury to the 
United States bas been prevented •••• 
In expelling these adventurers from these 
posts it was not intendei0to make any con-quest from Spain • • • • 
In the same message he proclaimed his intention to hold 
East Florida for the time being. 
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While the United States suppressed the establishment at 
Amelia Island, Andrew Jackson was ordered to check a serious 
peril in another part of Florida. The Seminoles were a Creek 
tribe living here. To them, as was noted before, in 1814 fled 
many of the Creek Indians who protested against the legality of 
the Treaty of Fort Jackson. Hostilities began when savages 
raided the homes of white settlers on the disputed lands. In 
November 181? Americans, under orders from General Gaines, com-
mander of the United States Army in the district, retaliated by 
burning Fowltown, killing .a few Indians and dispersing the rest. 
The Indians then ambushed a boatload of Americans on the Apala-
chicola River and massacred men, women, and children with great 
cruelty. Out of these circumstances grew the Seminole War, a 
war "not important in itself, but in the controversies which it 
provoked.ull 
The Secretary of War ordered General Andrew Jackson to the 
scene to bring the war to an end, giving him the authority he 
10 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 23. 
11 James Schouler, Historical Briefs, Dodd, Mead and Company, 
New York, N.Y., 1896, 9?. 
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had previously given Gaines, to follow the Indians, if necessary 
into Spanish territory. 
General Jackson construed these instruc-
tions into a mandate to seize and hold 
East Florida. On receiving them he wrote 
to Monroe the so-called Rhea letter. "Let 
it be signified to me through any cbannel (say Nr. Rhea) that the possession of Flor-
ida would be desirable to the United States 12 and in sixty days it shall be accomplished." 
Within a few days of receipt of orders from the War Depart-
ment, Jackson was on his way and by February 13 he encamped 
near Hartford, Georgia. There a packet of mail overtook him in 
which, as he always maintained, was a letter13 from Represent-
12 Dexter Perkins, "John Quincy Adams," Th§ Aferican Secre-
taries of State and Their Diplomacy, IV, 1 • 
13 Marquis James, Andrew Jackson, Garden City Publishing Com-
pany, New York, N.Y., 1933, 308. This biographer says this 
concerning the Rhea affair: "In later years, when the inci-
dent became the core of a muddy controversy, Monroe denied 
that he bad empowered Rhea to convey any such assurances. I 
my opinion the evidence favors Monroe's contention on this 
specific point. On the other hand - and this is far more 
important - the evidence is clear that the Administration 
understood General Jackson's intentions toward Florida, and 
by the absence of any restraining sign or syllable, gave its 
consent to them." 
James Schouler, in his Historical Briefs, holds that "only 
one of two theories appears tenable: · 
l) that Rhea imposed upon Jackson in the Florida business a 
pretended authority which the President never gave him - a 
situation which might well explain his anxiety in 1819 that 
his letter to Jackson should be destroyed; 
2) that the whole story was fabricated, in or about 1831 by 
Rhea and others in Jackson's confidence, for some political 
purpose, in connection with the Calhoun disclosures which 
they did not see fit to press. The latter hypothesis, I re-
gret for Jackson's sake, appears altogether more probable, 
and that hypothesis Wirt and John Quincy Adams accepted, men 
most competent to judge and not more disposed to favor Cal-
houn than Jackson." -
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ative Rhea, which transmitted to Jackson the President's "ap-
proval" of the General's suggestion "to effect an unofficially 
authorized seizure ot Florida ••• •• 
He followed the Indians across the border into East Florid~ 
captured the Spanish forts of St. Marks and Pensacola, and exe-
cuted, after court martial, two Englishmen, Ambrister and Ar-
buthnot, who were accused of assisting the Indians. The inabil-
ity of the Spanish government to police its own province and 
maintain order therein was to be the justification for his cour 
of action.l4 Jackson believed that the Indians were receiving 
aid and encouragement from St. Marks and Pensacola. He also 
was under the impression that Great Britain kept paid emissaries 
in Florida hostile to the United States. This latter presump-
tion seems to have been groundless. England had without doubt 
made some connection with the Indians during the war and had en-
couraged them to believe that with the treaty of peace they 
would be reimbursed for their losses, but there is no evidence 
tbat, after the termination of the war, she did not act in good 
faith in this matter.l5 
Jackson gave his reasons for this drastic procedure in a 
letter dated May 23, addressed to Don Jose Mazot, Governor of 
Pensacola: 
14 Hubert B. Fuller, The Purchase of Florida: Its Histo:a and 
Di~lomaex, Burrows Brothers Company, Cleveland, o., 1906, 
l r::' 24 • / Ibid. 
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On entering St. Marks, evidence of the 
duplicity and unfriendly feelings of the 
Commandant evinced itself. I found that 
the gates of the fort bad been thrown 
open to the avowed savage enemies of the 
United States; that councils of war bad 
been permitted to be held within his own 
quarters by the chiefs and warriors; that 
the Spanish storehouses bad been appro-
priated to the use and were then filled 
with goods belonging to the hostile party; 
that cattle knowingly plundered from the 
citizens of the United States bad been 
contracted for and purchased by the offi-
cers of the garrison from the Spanish 
thieves; that foreign agents had free 
access6witbin the walls of St. Marks • • • • 1 
By the 29th he had seized the royal archives and appointed 
one of his colonels military and civil governor. His proclama-
tion of May 29, 1818 declared in force the revenue laws of the 
United States. 
And thus Jackson bad again become the hero of the nation. 
16 A.S.P., F.R., IV, 568. 
CHAPTER IV 
FLORIDA, OBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS 
From the withdrawal ot James .Monroe and Charles Pinckney 
in 1805 to the arrival of George Erving as Minister to Spain in 
1814, scarcely anything of a diplomatic character between the 
two countries had been accomplished. The civil and foreign 
wars in which Spain was drawn had made it impossible to achieve 
anything in the affairs entrusted to our representatives there. 
The United States recognized neither Joseph Bonaparte nor 
the Central Junta which was presumably acting in the name ot 
Ferdinand VII during his imprisonment, and for that reason, 
George Erving, charge d'affaires till 1810, and Anthony .Morris, 
his successor till 1814, had only informal relations with the 
C-entral Junta. For the same reason, Chevalier Luis de Onis, 
although appointed as Minister to the United States by the 
Junta in 1809 waited nearly seven years before he received of-
ficial recognition from Washington. It is said that his non-
recognition was due also to the pro-French policy of Madison. 
His appointment after all emanated from a Spanish patriot 
assembly. 1 
Though cut off from his regular duties, 
Onis did not remain inactive. He did 
1 Brooks, 9. 
what he could to organize shipments of nec-
essary supplies to the Spanish patriots and 
to combat Bonapartist propaganda and not 
many months passed before his duties became 
infinitely more overwhelming with the out-
break of revolt in many widely separated 
provinces of Spain's American possessions.2 
He contrived to voice his grievances in spite of the lack 
of formal position in the diplomatic world. And he bad reason 
to complain on many points. There was, for instance, his own 
status, unrecognized and isolated. There was also a steady 
stream of propaganda emanating from·France and the United States 
encouraging the revolutions in the Spanish colonies. He knew 
furthermore that privateers and other vessels intended for the 
cause of the insurgent American provinces were fitted out in 
United States ports. On the occasion of the occupation and 
assimilation of West Florida and the invasion of East Florida 
he protested vehemently. 
Finally, on December 19, 1815, Onis' credentials were re-
ceived by the United States government. As soon as the Spanish 
government learned that its representative had been accepted at 
Washington, it yielded on the recognition of George Erving who 
had been re-appointed in 1814, this time as Minister of the 
United States to Spain. Erving at once presented the views of 
the administration to the authorities there, but before he 
could accomplish anything, the negotiations shifted to Washing-
2 Brevard, I, 27. 
ton at the request of Spain. It is thought that Erving's manner 
was not such as to promote satisfactory negotiations. Instruc-
tions were now sent to Onis on September 10, 1816, but they gave 
him no further powers than he already had. Even before these 
orders reached Washington, Cevallos, Foreign Minister for Spain, 
was removed from office. The King now appointed as the new 
I Spanish Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Jose Garcia de Leon y 
Pizarro. The latter's reputation for integrity and ability gave 
new hope in the United States for successful negotiations. 
In the meantime, Onis formulated the complaints and terri-
torial claims of Spain and asked that West Florida be returned 
to Spain pending the settlement of its title. In the name of 
Spain he protested most vigorously against the aid which he 
alleged agents of Mexico and other revolting colonies were re-
ceiving in the United States. 
In behalf of the United States the Secretary of State, 
James Monroe, submitted his counterclaims. These included the 
cession of Florida east of the Perdido River, the execution of 
the Claims Convention of 1802, and a western boundary for Lou-
isiana at the Colorado River (of Texas). If these terms were 
accepted, other claims against Spain would be dropped. That 
part of Florida west of the Perdido we claimed as ours by the 
cession of 1803 and our claims to the rest of Florida were 
grounded on the arguments of natural boundaries, need to control 
r 
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the Gulf, adequate outlet for the inland states, Spain's inabil-
ity. to take care of the province, the incursions of Florida In-
dians into the United States, and the use the British had made 
of Florida for military purposes in the recent war. 
Onis ••• sparred, temporized, and was at 
last forced to admit that he did not know 
whether a cession of territory would be 
considered by the Spanish court or not • • • 
On the territorial question he argued that 
Florida was worth more than Louisiana, but 
that if the United States should propose 
to exchange those provinces he would be 3 glad to forward such an offer to Madrid. 
Although many conferences and much correspondence took 
place on these matters between the principals concerned, both 
at Madrid and in Washington, by January 1817 no tangible results 
bad as yet been achieved. Monroe's final effort as Secretary 
of State was made when he tried to persuade Onis to accept the 
Colorado River of Texas as the western boundary of the United 
States. This proposal implied the exchange of the land between 
the Rio Grande and the Colorado River with the Floridas. 
Onis replied that he had understood that the negotiations 
concerned only the cession of the disputed part of Florida and 
that he doubted if the King would consent to the loss of East 
Florida especially on account of the important harbor of Pensa-
cola. In regard to Texas he claimed Monroe's plan would be no 
exchange since all of Texas belonged to Spain in any event. 4 
3 Griffin, 82. 
4 A.S.P., F,R., IV, 436. 
On this subject of the ownership of Texas we read that 
France held that the western limits of Lou-
isiana extended to the Rio Grande, and Amer-
ican statesmen of the day were practically 
unanimous in claiming Texas as part of the 
LouisianaJPurcbase. This claim was denied 
by Spain. 5 
5? 
Following his failure to negotiate along this line, Monroe 
reduced his proposition so as to involve only the claims. He 
wrote to Luis de Onis on January 14, 181? as follows: 
Having understood in our late conference 
that you would not agree to an arrangement 
by which Spain should cede her claims to 
terr~tory eastward of the Mississippi un-
less the United States ceded their claims 
to all the territory westward of that river, 
and that even then your agreement would be 
restricted to a recommendation to your gov-
ernment to adopt an arrangement to that ef-
fect, it is deemed lDllllecessary to make you 
any further proposition, or to prolong the 
negotiation on the subject of limits. 
I have now to request that you will 
have the goodness to inform me whether you 
are willing to enter into a convention to 
provide compensation for spoliations, and 
for the injuries resulting to the United 
States from the suppression of the deposits 
at New Orleans ••• o 
On July 16, 181?, Pizarro wrote to Erving offering to con-
tinue the negotiations at Madrid. Erving however felt he cquld 
not encourage a further procrastination and therefore asked the 
Foreign Minister to submit Spain 1 s terms of settlement. By 
5 John H. Latane, A Histo of American Forei n Po ic , 
6 
Doubleday, Page and Company, Garden City, N.Y., 1 27, 117. 
A.S.P., F.R., IV, 437• 
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August 17, 1817, these bad been presented. Pizarro no doubt 
realized that the United States would probably not accept the 
Mississippi as a western boundary. This idea was incorporated 
in his proposal. He therefore offered an alternate, namely, 
to submit the whole affair to the mediation of one or more 
Powers friendly to both nations. Erving thought that England 
and Russia were the Powers on which Spain depended chiefly and 
that Pizarro had intentionally offered an unacceptable plan in 
order to have the dispute brought before other Powers for arbi-
tration. Like all the other efforts at a settlement, this too 
ended in failure. Onis was then instructed to make the same 
proposals at Washington. He was to leave nothing undone on the 
other band to prevent a breach of relations between the two 
countries. Onis received these new instructions on October 21, 
1817. Within a few weeks there came to the office of Secretary 
of State, an American who by ability and experience could not 
have been better fitted for his work, John Quincy Adams. The 
new Secretary studied the problem thoroughly and early in 1818 
be proposed terms which did not materially differ from those 
offered to Spain in 1805. Recognizing the importance of defin-
ing the western limits of the United States, he drew up a de-
tailed proposal including boUndaries, claims, and the cession 
ot the Floridas in one sweeping treaty. 
About the same time Spain invited Great Britain to act as 
mediator. That government however.intimated that it would act 
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in this capacity only if the request came from both Spain and 
the United States. John Quincy Adams• attitude regarding this 
proposal anticipated the position of the United States in world 
affairs as expressed in the Monroe Doctrine. On March 18, 1818 
he wrote: 
The United States, in justice to them-
selves, in justice to that harmony which 
they earnestly desire to cultivate with 
all the powers of Europe, in justice to 
the fundamental system of policy which 
forbids them from entering the labyrinth 
of European politics, must decline so-
liciting or acceding to the interfer-
ence of any Government of Europe for 
the settlement of their differences with 
Spain.7 
Spain suffered another disappointment when the British 
government declined to give her military or even diplomatic 
support. England wanted peace more than anything else at 
this moment. 
FUrthermore, Adams• and Onis 1 efforts to arrive at an un-
derstanding were seriously handicapped by the disturbing devel-
opments at Galveston and on Amelia Island, affairs referred to 
above. Reports of the McGregor-Aury enterprises in East Flor-
ida and of the plot to revolutionize Texas were coming in. 
Onis protested vigorously when the United States troops occu-
pied Galveston and Amelia Island. Adams replied that if Spain 
could have protected her own lands, the United states would not 
have to do it for her. Amelia Island proved to be a source of 
7 A.S.P., F.R., III, 16. 
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irritation throughout the negotiations, but nevertheless, 
United States troops stayed there till after the signing of the 
treaty. Regarding Galveston, we based our right to occupy that 
island on the claim that it lay within the United States. 
The attitude of the United states toward the Spanish-Amer-
ican republics continued to be a retarding factor in the nego-
tiations also. The American government had already given a 
definite status to the insurgent colonies by its neutrality leg-
islation. After the passage of the 1815 law, the privateering 
business at Baltimore and New Orleans continued to grow, and as 
a result, Qnis' notes on the subject became more frequent and 
more bitter. The Department of state assured Onis that ade-
quate measures had been taken to prosecute persons found guilty 
of unneutral acts, but it was only too true that the authori-
ties often lacked sufficient legal evidence to bring about 
conviction of the guilty. To appease the Spanish minister, 
more stringent neutrality laws were passed in 1817 and 1818. 
Violations of these laws by individuals continued nevertheless. 
The negotiations dragged on and on. 
In May 1818, John Quincy Adams wrote to Albert Gallatin: 
The correspondence between~. Onis and 
this government has been little more than 
a repetition on both sides of that which 
bad taken place at Aranjuez, at the period 
of the extraordinary mission to Spain in 
1805, and it has terminated in a note from 
Mr. Onis stating that he :1s under the neces-
sity of sending again a messenger to Spain 
for new instructions and for a8further en-
largement of his powers •••• 
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Meanwhile the Spanish Foreign Office on April 15, 1818 
instructed Spain's representative here "to cede positively and 
without limitations the Floridas in return for some reasonable 
equivalent west of the Mississippi and to obtain from the United 
States a promise not to assist the revolt of the Spanish colo-
nies in South America or to recognize their independence."9 
It was obviously sound policy to dispose 
of the territory gracefully and for a con-
sideration while this could yet be done, 
rather than lose it after a bloody, expen-
sive, and probably humiliating war. Spain's 
distress again prepared the way for another 
American diplomatic success.lO 
Now it was only a matter of time to bring about an agree-
ment about the exchange of the Floridas for all the financial 
obligations for which the United States held Spain responsible. 
The difficult~es still to be overcome hinged mostly on the 
western boundary problem. Onis was prepared through instruc-
tions from Pizarro to drop back to one compromise line after 
the other, the most western to be the eastern boundary of 
8 Writings of Johri Quincy Adams, VI, 313. 
9 Bemis, 190. 
10 Bailey, 1?1. 
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Texas. Adams contended that it should be the Rio Grande. 
By June 1818 news of Jackson's military activities began 
to filter in and threatened to jeapordize the success of the 
negotiation. When Onis first heard rumors concerning Jackson's 
expedition, ~e discounted them and made.no protest. A few days 
later, however, he had received information from the governor 
of West Florida. Immediately he addressed a protest to Adams, 
dated June 17, on the taking of St. Marks; on the 24th, Adams 
received a new note relative to the seizure of Pensacola; and 
on July 7, Adams was aroused from bed by a messenger who in-
formed him that Onis wanted an interview immediately upon sub-
jects of the highest importance to both countries. Onis there-
upon demanded the surrender of the posts, indemnity for losses 
suffered, and a satisfaction proportioned to the enormity of 
the offences, together with the lawful punishment of the general 
and the officers of this government who were in collusion with 
Jackson. 
"How is it possible," he exclaimed, "to 
·believe that at the very moment of a ne-
gotiation for settling and terminating 
amicably all the pending differences be-
tween the two nations and while Spain was 
exhibiting the most generous proofs of a 
good understanding • • • the troops of 
the United States should invade the Span-
ish provinces, insult the commanders and 
officers of their military garrisons and 
forcibly seize the military posts and 
places in these provinces?"ll 
It was a serious situation in that it endangered not only 
the negotiations for Florida, but might involve the country in 
war. The Spanish-American revolutions, the determination of 
the American government to possess the Floridas, and the dead-
lock over the western boundary all combined to constitute suf-
ficient cause for war. It was left to Monroe and his advisers 
to find a way out of the situation in which the fiery Jackson 
bad involved them. For several days the Cabinet discussed the 
matter. 
They wanted to buy Florida, not conquer 
it. They bad entertained no thought of 
authorizing the things that Jackson had 
done. They recognized that the Tennes-
seean's crude notions of international 
law could not be upheld in dealings with 
proud European States. Yet it was borne 
in upon them from every side that the 
nation approved what had been done; and 
the politically ambitious might well 
think twice before casting any slur up-
on the acts of the people's hero.L2 
Adams was the only member of the Cabinet who justified 
Jackson's activities as being compatible with the dictates of 
international law. He advised that the blame be placed on 
Spain for bar lax administration. 
11 
12 
John S. Bassett, The Life of Andrew Jackson, Revised 
Edition, Doubleday, Page and Company, Garden City, N.Y., 
1929, I, 266. . 
Frederic A. Ogg, ttThe Reign of Andrew Jackson, tt The Fron-
tier .in Politics, (Volume XII of The Cbronicles of America 
Series), 61. · 
My principle is that everything he (Andrew Jackson) did was defensive; that 
as such it was neither war against Spain 
nor violation of the Constitution ••• 
the defense of it against the objections 
of the President, and of all the other 
members of the Cabinet present, engaged 
us again till five o'clock • • • I at 
first contended that we should keep Pen-
sacola ••• till Spain should give us a 
guarantee that she would fulfill her en-
gagement by restraining the Indians from 
hostilities. But I see difficulties in 
holding Penf~cola without an act of Con-
gress • • • ..:S 
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The note that was finally sent to the Spanish minister on 
July 23, 1818, contained no disavowal of General Jackson al-
though it did provide for the return of Pensacola to Spain and 
for similar action with regard to St. Marks if a force large 
enough for its protection against hostile Indians were sent to 
receive it. 
I am instructed by the President to in-. 
form you that Pensacola will be restored 
to the possession of any person duly au-
thorized on the part of Spain to receive 
it; that the fort of St. Marks, being 1n 
the heart of the Indian country and re-
mote from any Spanish settlement 1 can be surrendered only to a force suff1ciently 
strong to hold it against the attack of 
hostile Indians ••• 14 
The offer to surrender Pensacola was a shrewd middle 
course taken both for the sake of protecting Jackson and sooth-
ing the irritated feelings of Spain. 
Resolutions in both Houses of Congress were introduced to 
13 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, IV, 111. 
14 !&f •, E.:!!.·, IV, 499. 
investigate the violation of our n.eutrality obligations •. In 
the House Jackson was acquitted and in the Senate the matter 
was dropped because of the growing popularity of the military 
hero. 
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Our l':linister at the Court of St. James, Richard Rush, 
quoted Castlereagh as saying that English feeling was so 
aroused that war could have resulted "if the ministry had but 
held up a finger.nl5 !be newspapers of London were bitter in 
their denunciation of the United States. "We can hardly be-
lieve that anything so offensive to public decorum could be 
admitted even in America," was the comment of one London jour-
nal.l6 The British government however did not register a for-
mal protest. One authority maintains that we may well believe 
that considering the traditional jealousy with which Great 
Britain has ever protected the interests and the lives of her 
citizens that there was an ulterior motive at work which de-
termined Lord Castlereagh and his compeers in their decision.l7 
That is probable in view of the fact that England could look 
only to the United States for support against the reactionary 
16 Fuller, 2 53. 
l7 Ibid., 253. 
doctrines of the Holy Alliance.l8 
In Madrid the wrath of Pizarro had been aroused to such a 
degree that negotiations were suspended for a time. He wrote 
on August 29, 1818 to Erving, saying 
••• that His Majesty was convinced that 
it was incompatible with the honor of the 
crown to pursue further negotiations until 
proper amends were made for Jackson's ac-
tion and that the incident wa.s of primary 
importance capable of producing an essen-
tial and thorough change in the1~olitical relations of the two countries. ~ 
18 The following is a copy of an abstract of a speech deliv-
ered by Lord Liverpool as it appeared on July 26, 1819 1n 
The Niles' Weekly Register, {XVI, 314). 
19 
In the House of Lords, the 11th of May, 
Lord Lansdowne moved for copies of all 
communications which had passed between 
the English government and the govern-
ment of the United States, respecting 
the Floridas, and more particularly re-
specting the trial and execution of two 
British subjects, by order of the Amer-
ican General Jackson. Lord Liverpool 1n 
reply said that the cession of the Flor-
idas by Spain was a subject which the Eng-
lish government had nothing to do with; 
Spain having a right to cede any part of 
her possessions she pleased without the 
interference of any foreign government. 
With respect to the affair of A.r-
buthnot and Ambrister, although he cen-
sured the conduct of General Jackson, 
those persons bad no right to the pro-
tection of their government, if they 
voluntarily embarked in war against 
any state with which their government 
was at peace. 
A .S .P., E..Ji., IV, 523. 
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The whole episode of Jackson's invasion, however, was from 
the standpoint of the Florida negotiations a help rather than a 
hindrance to their successful termination, for it demonstrated 
to the Spanish government that it was in the physical power of 
the United States to seize the Floridas, and that if occasion 
arose, she also would do so. 
In November Adams despatched to George Erving his famous 
defense of Jackson. Adams' powerful note reads in part as fol-
lows: 
••• it must carry demonstration irre-
sistible to the Spanish government, that 
the right of the United States can as 
little compound with impotence as with 
perfidy, and that Spain must immediately 
make her election, either to place a 
force in Florida adequate at once to the 
protection of her territory, and to the 
fulfillment of her engagements, or cede 
to the United States a province, of which 
she retains nothing but the nominal pos-
session, but which is, in fact, a dere-
lict, open to the occupancy of every 
enemy, civilized or savage, of the unit-
ed States, and serving no other earthly 
purpose than as a post of annoyance to 
them.20 
The President's Message to Congress late in 1818 gave ex-
pression also to the principal motive that the United States 
had at this time for desiring the Floridas. 
Throughout the whole of those provinces 
to which the Spanish title extends, the 
government of Spain has scarcely been 
felt. Its authority bas been confined 
20 1Jll4. ' IV' 542 • 
almost exclusively to the wall of Pensa-
cola and St. Augustine, within which only 
small garrisons have been maintained. Ad-
venturers from every country, fugitives 
from justice! and absconding slaves have 
found an asy um there. Several tribes of 
Indians, strong in the number of their 
warriors, remarkable for their ferocity 
••• have violated our laws prohibiting 
the introduction of slaves, and practiced 
frauds on our revenue, and committed ev-
ery kind of outrage on our peaceable cit-
izens, which their proximi~Y to us enable 
them to perpetrate • • • • 1 
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Spain's indignation subsided quickly for already on Octo-
ber 18, 1818, Luis de Onis wrote informing the Secretary of 
State that he had received new instructions to resume negotia-
tions and also that the King on July 9, 1818 had at last rati-
fied the Convention of August 11, 1802. 
The French minister to the United States during this en-
tire period was Baron Hyde de Neuville. He has been character-
ized as a thorough reactionary in French polities but he was 
not without sympathy for our country. It was he who spoke of 
Jackson as the "Napoleon of the woods." It is quite commonly 
understood that without his services the Treaty of 1819 could 
not have been secured.22 He bad never been asked formally to 
act as mediator, but his informal services were accepted gra-
eiousq by both Onis and Adams. He had instructions to use his 
21 A.S.P., F.R., IVf 214. 
22 R. H. c. Cattera 1, "A French Diplomat and the Treaty with 
Spain 1819l" The American Historical Review, New York, N.Y., 
XI, 495. ( pril 1906). _ 
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influence to preserve peace and he realized tbat his strategy 
should be to persuade Spain to cede the Floridas for whatever 
she could get in the settlement of the Louisiana boundary. 
His first opportunity to prevent war came 
in the fall of 1817 when he supported 
Adams in his opposition to Monroe's desire 
to recognize Buenos Ayres. • • • Jackson's 
seizure of Pensacola gave him an opportu-
nity of direct intervention. Adams refused 
to disavow Jackson's act and desired the 
French minister to secure a proposal from 
Spain; this be did, and then, acting as 
mediator, continued the negotiation until 
a compromise had been effected.23 
At times his intervention seemed fruitless for neither 
Adams nor Onis was willing to budge from his position, but 
British passivity and Jackson's military movements convinced 
Spain's rulers at last of the impossibility of physically hold-
ing the province, and this fact greatly strengthened Adams' 
hand in dealing with Onis. In the subsequent discussions the 
services of Hyde de Neuville fully justified themselves. Adams 
finally gave up Texas and accepted the Sabine River to the 
thirty-second degree and from there a line due north to the 
Red River. 
Adams bad consistently championed the claim to all of 
Texas and it is quite likely tbat be could have secured at 
least that part of Texas east of the Colorado River, but he 
felt himself overruled by the Presid.ent ·and Cabinet.24 
23 Ibid. 
24 ~wick, 139. 
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Adams would not however agree to the balance of the plan 
laid down by PizaDro. He insisted that the boundary line fol-
low the Red River west to 100 degrees west longitude, then to 
the Arkansas and westward up that stream to its source. From 
there he insisted on going northward to the forty-second paral-
lel and then westward to the Pac1f1~ Ocean. The success of 
this proposal manifested genuine diplomatic genius on the part 
of John Quincy Adams. When the adversaries reached the stage 
of proJets, Adams found that Onis had described the Floridas 
according to the Treaty of 1763 and with the limits assigned 
by the Treaty of 1795. 
Such a definition would comprise the 
disputed territory already in American 
possession and involved the total syr-
render of the American contention.25 
Adams' suggestion that His Catholic Majesty cede to the 
United States ••all the territories which belong to him, sit-
uated eastward of the Mississippi, known by the names of East 
and West Florida," was recommended by De Neuville, for he main-
tained this wording covered the honor of both countries and 
paved the way for an understanding of the cession that could 
not in the future be misconstrued. This phrasing of the ces-
sion of Florida now-left undetermined the question as to 
whether Spain owned any or all of West Florida. One American 
r 
historian says: 
If this is to be interpreted as an un-
equivoeal.cession it means that John Quincy Adams by implication in the trea-
ty of 1819 finally recognized the jus- · 
tice of Spain's title to the two Flor-
idas up to February 22, 1819, and by 
inference branded Jefferson's claim to 
and occupation of West Florida as high-
handed and outrageous. This was balm 
to Spain to have the Uhited States ac-
cept a cession. But the wording of the 
cession is subtle indeed.26 
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In concluding the negotiations, Onis prudently took upon 
himself the responsibility of eliminating two of the Spanish 
demands. One had to do with a neutral ground along the border 
which Onis believed would provide another paradise for pirates 
and smugglers and the other was the demand tbat the United 
States promise not to recognize the insurgent colonies as in-
dependent, a request which be knew would be useless in any case 
It is quite likely that Spain decided to surrender Florida 
at this time, at least partly because her hopes of an interven-
tion by the powers assembled at Aix la Cbapelle bad been 
crushed. Henry Adams contends that the European situation did 
help to precipitate Spain into a decision to complete the ne-
gotiations. 
This (October 1818) was the period when 
Spain's American colonies were in revolt, 
and it was of the highest importance to 
the United States that Europe should 
26 Bemis, 191. 
intervene in no way in the quarrel. Mr. 
Gallatin's business was to obtain early 
information of whatever concerned this 
subject, and to prepare the European pow-
ers tor the recognition by the United 
States of the South American republics. 
So tar as the policy ot the United States 
was concerned, the result of this con-
gress at Aix la Chapelle was very 
favorable, tor Spain, finding herself 
abandoned by Europe, was driven into a 
treaty for the sale of Florida.27 
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A recent historian claims that "the new head of the Span-
ish government, Irujo, hastened the conclusion of the negotia-
tions with the United States in order to give Spain a free hand 
for the reconquest of its American colonies by means of the 
great expeditionary force which it was assembling at Cadiz 
at this time.n28 
27 Henry Adams, Life ot Albert Gallatin, Peter Smith, New 
York, N.Y., (reprinted under auspices ot the American 
28 Library Association), 1943, 573. Whitaker, 266. 
CHAPTER V 
FLORIDA, OUR OWN 
The last differences were finally settled and on the day 
appointed, February 22, 1819, John Quincy Adams and Luis de 
Onis signed a treaty which conceded most of the points contend-
ed for by the united States. The document was called Treaty 
of Friendship, Cession of the Floridas, an4 Boundaries, and 
the essential points are given here in abbreviated form: 
I. There was to be a firm and inviolable peace between 
the parties. 
II. East and West Florida were ceded to the United States. 
III. The western boundary of the United States was to begin 
"in the sea" at the mouth of the Sabine River, 
up that river along west bank to 320 parallel, 
then due north to Red River 
up that river to 1000 meridian, 
then due north to the Arkansas River, 
up that river along its southern bank to its source, 
then due north to 42o 
along that parallel to the South Sea. 
IV. Provision for a survey of western boundary was made. 
V. The inhabitants were to enjoy free exercise of religion 
and the right to emigrate. 
VI. The inhabitants of these ceded territories were to be 
incorporated in the Union of the United States as soon 
as the Constitution permitted. 
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VII. Ceded territories were to be handed over to the United 
States and troops of Spain withdrawn within six months 
after exchange of ratification. 
VIII. All grants of land in ceded territory made by Spain 
before January 24, 1818, were to be recognized by the 
United States. 
IX. The United States and Spain renounced their claims in 
the Convention of 1802. 
X. The Convention of 1802 was annulled. 
XI. The United States assumed claims of its own citizens 
· against Spain to the extent of $5,ooo,ooo. A special 
commission to hear these claims was created. 
XII. Modification of the Treaty or 1795 was negotiated. 
XIII. Deserters from merchant vessels should be mutually 
arrested and delivered. 
XIV. The United States certified that it had not received 
compensation from France for seizures made by French 
privateers and condemnations by the French tribunals 
on the coasts and in the ports or Spain.l 
XV. For a term or twelve years the ports of Pensacola and 
St. Augustine were to remain open to Spanish vessels 
laoen with goods of Spanish production without paying 
other or higher duties • • • than were to be paid by 
the vessels of the United States. 
XVI. Ratifications were to be exchanged within six months.2 
• 
By the delineation of the international boundary line from 
the Gulf to the Pacific, the United States acquired all of 
Spain's rights north of 42o, and at the same time, was assured 
for the first time of a transcontinental domain. 
1 France agreed to pay these claims in 1831. 
2 Charles E. Hill, Leading American Treaties, The Macmillan 
Company, New York, N.Y., 1922, 169. 
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We read in the Diary of the Secretary of State for the day 
of the signing this entry: 
The acquisition of the Floridas bas long 
been an object of earnest desire to this 
country. The acknowledgment of a definite 
line of boundary to the South Sea forms a 
great epoch in our history. The first 
proposal of it in this negotiation was my 
own, and I trust it is now secured beyond 
the reach of revocation.3 
Luis de Onis had proven himself to be an able minister 
handicapped as he was with a weak government continually dis-
tracted by internal disorders and foreign wars. He prevented 
the United States from taking Texas and by a settlement for 
claims, he freed his country from a financial obligation which 
would have been wellnigh impossible to meet in any case. 
The ratification process, like the negotiations, was at-
tended by strained conditions. New ministers replaced the old. 
The President bad commissioned John Forsyth as Minister to 
Spain in March 1819. The new Spanish Foreign Minister, Mar-
ques de Casa Irujo, was the same who had been recalled to Spain 
at our government's request because of activities here objec-
tionable to our administration. 
Our ministry in Spain bad discovered, in February 1819, 
that His Catholic Majest~ had made huge grants 1n Florida to 
three Court favorites. Adams tiad failed to read carefully 
3 The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1842, edited by Allan 
Nevins, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, N.Y., 1928, 
211. 
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the correspondence dated February 6, 1819, and therefore was 
not cognizant of this deal until after the treaty was signed • 
• • • it was evident that ·the grants had 
been sought in anticipation of a probable 
treaty of cession, that they bad been 
made to favorites of the Spanish Court 
and that they were made on no other con-
sideration.4 
This neglect on Adams' part necessitated a demand that 
Spain expressly cancel those grants when ratifying the treaty. 
On March 10, 1819, therefore, the Secretary of State wrote to 
Luis de Onis: 
As these grants, however are known to 
the Government of the U~ted States only 
from rumor, without the knowledge of 
their dates, it is proper that, on ex-
changing the ratifications, your Govern-
ment should know that whatever the date 
of those grants may have been, it was 
fully understood by us that they are all 
annulled by the treaty, as much as if they 
had been specifically named, and that they 
will be so held by the United States. To 
avoid any possible misconception, your 
answer to this statement is requested; 
and the exchange of the ratifications 
will be made, under the explicit declara-. 
tion and understanding that all the above 
mentioned grants, and all others, de-
rived from them, are null and vo~d.' 
5 A.S.P., ~., IV, 651. 
Two years later, John Quincy Adams still manifested a 
bitterness about this incident. On February 22, 1821, 
he confided to his Diary: "Under the petals of this 
garland of roses • • • Onis bad hidden a viper. His 
mock sickness, his use of De Neuville as a tool to 
perpetrate a fraud which he did not dare attempt to 
carry through himself, his double dealing before and 
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John Forsyth was instructed to obtain an express renun-
ciation of the grants to these three favorites and to preserve 
the right of the United States to be named first in one of the 
certificates of ratification and also the right of the repre-
sentative of the United States to sign first one of these cer-
tificates.6 
Forsyth presented himself at Madrid on May 18, 1819, and 
informed the Spanish officials of his readiness~ to exchange the 
ratifications of the-treaty. Dilatory tactics were the order 
of.the day at the Spanish end however. 
after the signature • • • his shuffling equivocations 
here and in Spain, to acquire the reputation of having 
duped the President and me, were but mater~als in the 
hands of my enemies to dose me with poison extracted 
from the laurels of the treaty itself. An ambiguity 
of date, which I bad suffered to escape my notice at 
the signature of the treaty, amply guarded against by 
the phraseology of the article • • • was the handle 
upon which the King of Spain, his rapacious favorites, 
and American swindling landjobbers in conjunction with 
them, withheld the ratification of the treaty, while 
Clay and his admirers were snickering at the simplic-
ity with which I had been bamboozled by the crafty 
Spaniard." The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 265. 
Philip c. Brooks, however, after research, says: 
"I do not believe, as Adams charged, that Onis intend-
ed to defraud the United States in the notorious mat-
ter of the land grants.although King Ferdinand was 
quite culpable." Brooks, vi. 
6 A.S.P., ~.,IV, 650. 
The treaty had become disliked in official 
circles in Spain; the influence of the 
three grantees was one feature against it; 
and the Spanish Government still vainly 
hoped for some modification of the American 
attitude toward independence in SouthAmer-
ica.7 
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On June 13, 1819 Irujo was dismissed from office since he 
was considered responsible for the treaty. By AUgust 22, 1819, 
the period for ratification had expired without any.action hav-
ing been taken. 
Forsyth was perhaps not the best statesman the United 
States could have had at that trying post.8 He was harsh and 
arrogant in his dealings with the Spanish Foreign Office, and 
as a result, the Spanish government decided to transfer the 
negotiations to Washington again. It sent as its envoy General 
Don Francisco Dionisio Vives. In his first message Vives re-
vealed the cause for Spanish delay. He protested against the 
"scandalous system of piracies" that were being carried on from 
the ports of the United States against the Spanish dominions 
and on the general spirit of hostility toward Spain prevalent 
everywhere in the country. In his communication of April 14, 
1820 to the Secretary of State he asked the United States to 
promise 
that they will form no relations with the 
pretended Governments of the revolted 
7 Miller, III, 47. 
8 Eugene I. McCormac, "John Forsyth," American Secretaries of 
State and Their Diplomacy, IV, 303. 
provinces of Spain situate beyond sea, 
and will conform to the course of pro-
ceeding adopted, in this respect, 9by other Powers in amity with Spain. 
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Adams in reply asserted that nothing could release a sov-
ereign from the obligation to ratify a treaty unless his repre-
sentative empowered to carry on such a negotiation bad been dis 
loyal to his trust and had transcended his instructions.lO 
At this point there· was a change in government in Spain'' 
which provided for the adoption of a constitution. As a result 
the sovereign was prohibited from alienating any part whatever 
of the Spanish realm without the consent of the Cortes. Vives 
then informed Adams that the King would lay the treaty before 
this body in July. Forsyth too bent every effort toward final 
adjustment or the negotiations and his efforts were rewarded 
by the Spanish Cortes who after annulling the three land grants 
advi~ed the King to ratify the treaty. This the King did on 
October 24, 1820. 
The document of ratification was on its way from Madrid 
to Washington nearly four months. Monroe felt himself obliged 
to submit it once more to the Senate for its ratification and 
consent since the time limit for ratification by Spain had ex-
pired long before. 
Up to this time public sentiment had been in favor of the 
9 A.S.P., F.R., IV, 680. 
10 ~., 682:" 
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treaty. There was however some opposition when it came up agai 
in Congress. In the House Clay denounced the surrender of 
Texas, and four members of the Senate, all from western states, 
voted against the treaty, implying the same criticism. In the 
main, however, there was widespread approval. The inclusion of 
Texas within the boundaries of the United States would certain-
ly have kindled the flames of a sectional controversy ove~ 
slavery. It was necessary, after all, for Onis to have some 
material satisfaction to show up for his concessions to us, for 
it would never have been possible for the Spanish government 
to agree to the cession of Texas also. 
With the certificate of ratification of the treaty, an 
order was issued to General Vives for the evacuation and de-
livery of the Floridas. Andrew Jackson was appointed commis-
sioner to receive the province from Spain, and also its first 
governor. He no doubt accepted the appointment in the spirit 
in which it was given, that is, in vindication of his campaign 
in the late Seminole War. 
The cbange of flags in East Florida took 
place.at St. Augustine, lOth of July, 1821, 
under Governor Coppinger on the part of 
Spain, and Colonel Robert Butler on the 
,part of the United States; in West Flor-
ida, at Pensacola, on the 21st of July, 
1821 1 Governor Callava represented the Span1sh Government and Gen~ral Jackson 
that of the United States.ll 
11 George R. Fairbanks, History of Florida 1212-1842, 
J. B. Lippincott and Company, Philadelphia, Pa., 1871, 
268. 
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On this occasion, the government officers, the Spanish 
garrison,and some or the inhabitants boarded a ship destined 
for Cuba, but the greater number of the colonists remained to 
become citizens of the United States.12 
According to Article XI of the treaty three commissioners 
were appointed to carry out its provision in reference to the 
claims of American citizens against Spain. The three commis-
sioners were: Hugh Lawson White of Tennessee, William King 
of Maine, and Littleton Waller Tazewell of Virginia. It is 
said that Monroe could not have made a more judicious choice or 
men to execute this arduous trust. Claims to the extent of 
$5,454,545.1313 were allowed by this commission, and these 
claims were paid pro rata. On June 8, 1824, this board ad-
journed sine die, after having been in session for the full 
treaty period of three years. 
Now that Florida was in the possession of the United 
States, there was no further reason for delaying recognition 
of the new republics in South America. Accordingly, in March 
1822, Congress appropriated the necessary funds for missions 
to the new governments.l4 Other historians addUce reasons 
quite different from that mentioned above. They say that the 
delay in recognition did not hinge on the Florida settlement. 
12 Brevard, I, 63. This authority says that the exchange of 
flags at Pensacola took place on July 7, 1821. 
13 Moore, v, 4518. 
14 Abbey, 141. 
One of this group writes; 
• • • there appears to be no foundation 
for the assertion ••• that the American 
government postponed recognition of Span-
ish-American independence until the treaty 
had been safely negotiated and ratified 
• • • The postponement of recognition was 
mainly due to two other factors: first, to 
the situation in Spanish America where 
there was no government that was clearly 
entitled to recognition, and second, to 
the attitude of Europe, which, the admini-
stration believed, made it dangerous to 
recognize any Spanish-American government 
no ~tter how meritorious its case might 
be. 
15 Whitaker, 273. 
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CHAPTER VI 
FLORIDA TRANSACTIONS APPRAISED 
John Quincy Adams considered that the transactions con-
nected with the Treaty of 1819 ranked first in importance of 
all the negotiations which were conducted during his tenure 
as United States Secretary of State. That he is right no one 
can gainsay, for this treaty marks one of the principal mile-
stones in the history of the United States in its rise to 
world power. 
Appraisals on the part of others concerning this whole 
matter differ widely. Editorial comments in the Niles' Week-
ly Register concurrent with the events show unequivocal ap-
proval of the acquisition of this territory. We read, for 
instance, 
The fact has long been evident, that a 
sovereignty over these countries was 
needful to our peace and quietness, and 
that we would possess them by fair or 
foul means - by treaty or force.l 
A few months later the same editor had this to say: 
They (the British) give us great credit 
for the ingenuity with which we managed 
the negotiations and many of their news-
papers pretty plainly insinuate that we 
1 Niles' WeeklY Register, XVI, 13. (February 27, 1819). 
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cheated Spain into the treaty; the im-
pudence of such articles are equalled 
only by their want of candor, nay of 
plain truth, Spain owes much money to 
our merchants for ••• spoliations on 
our commerce. The United States agrees 
to pay five millions ••• and retire 
from a demand of further indemnities, 
if Spain will cede a country worse than 
useless to her and which having for-
feited its character as a neutral, 
ought to have been taken possession of 
by us long ago, upon every principle 
of right, reason, and law. The omis-
sion to do it was among the greatest 
political sins of the last administra-
tion.2 
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It is quite safe to say that these editorials reflect the 
convictions of the West and the South or that period. 
History has not stigmatized John Quincy Adams for his 
share in the acquisition of Florida, but regarding some phases 
of the transaction, there are steps which cannot bear up under 
scrutiny from the standpoint of ethics. Concerning these, 
recent historians soundan unmistakable note of disapproval of 
the methods employed by those to whose hands was entrusted the 
government of the nation. It may be of interest to quote a 
few of their indictments and these may well serve as a conclu-
sion to this essay. 
2 
Jefferson turned to France for aid to 
consummate his purpose, to Napoleon and 
Talleyrand - to two of the most unscru-
pulous and far-seeing men who ever lived 
• • • • Imperialism and militarism were 
far afield from Jefferson's political 
~.,XVI, 225, (May 29, 1819). 
and social theories; but the necessity 
of French aid and consent in the gain-
ing of any part of the Floridas uncon-
sciously tinged his every move and pow~r­
fully affected those of his successor.j 
These Florida incidents furnish the first 
instances of the enunciation of certain 
peculiar arguments to justify the United 
States in possessing itself of choice 
bits of territory here and there, argu-
ments which have been used with great 
and continued effect in relation to 
Texas, Hawaii, Jlexico and Cuba.4 
In the question of the ownership of West 
Florida it is impossible not to think 
the United States greatly 1n the wrong 
and that our action redounds to the 
credit of no one of the American ad-
ministration connected with it.J 
There is no American today who is not 
ashamed of our wholly unwarranted meth-
od of despoiling Mexico; can we feel· 
any prouder of our Florida acquisition?6 
In diplomacy the Adams-Onis Treaty re-
vealed the growing influence of the 
United States. The country was still 
taking advantage of Europe 1 s distress, 
as has been done in Jay's and Pinck-
ney"s treaties; this time the distress 
was Spain's almost alone.7 
3 Channing, IV, 348. 
4 Babcock, 26. 
5 Cbadwick1 68. 6 Fuller, j30. 
7 Brooks, 195. 
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deserve special comment. 
Philip Coolidge Brooks did research in foreign countries 
preparatory to the writing of his valuable work, Diplomacy and 
the Borderlands: The Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819, especially in 
the archives o:f Madrid. He says in his Preface that "the role 
played by Spain has been the phase most neglected by historians 
and it forms the core of this narrative. Accordingly, the 
central theme is the career of Don Luis de Onis as Spanish 
minister to this country from 1809 to 1819 ... 1 He decided on 
this sub-title to give credit to the two diplomats who nego-
tiated it. Brooks had access to a manuscript biography of 
Luis de Onis, which he procured from a descendant of Onis who 
is now Professor Federico de Onis of Columbia University. 
Kathryn Trimmer Abbey's Florida, Land of Change bas 
been evaluated by critics as "the first really scholarly 
1 Brooks, ii. 
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attempt at a complete history of the area and the state of 
Florida.n2 The author is professor of history at the Florida 
State College for Women. She drew heavily on articles written 
for various historical periodicals and her bibliography leads 
one to think that she drew mainly from secondary works. Howev-
er, its worth is undeniable. 
Hubert Bruce Fuller's The Purchase of Florida: Its 
History and Diplomacy will not rate as high among scholars as 
Brooks' production. This is to be expected since he had not 
the opportunity to study European documents. Hubert Bruce 
Fuller however leaves nothing unsaid by way of condemnation 
of the ethical standards on the part of our government in this 
transaction. 
Caroline Nays Brevard, A History of Florida from the 
Treaty of 1Z63 to Our Own Times, is a survey as the title 
indicates. It also contains valuable appendices with statis-
tics and data on officials that functioned in that region dur-
ing that early period, a feature not entered into in this 
thesis. 
In regard to the Memoirs of Luis de Onis, these were 
written in Madrid in 1820 and then translated from the Span-
ish and supplemented with notes by Tobias Watkins.3 A copy 
2 The American Historical Review, XLVII, 365. (1942). 
3 Memoirs upon the Negotiations between Spain and the United 
States of America Which Led to the Treaty of 1819, by Don 
Luis de Onis. 
of these Memoirs is preserved in the Ayer Collection of the 
Newberry Library. The book has little to offer to the his-
torian if what the translator says in his Preface is true. 
This work contains a singular mixture of 
the veriest slander, and the most extra-
ordinary eulogy, upon our country and 
countrymen, that was ever heaped upon 
them by foe or friend. Onis had been 
accused of sullying the dignity of Fer-
dinand VII by a disgraceful treaty and 
that he had been influenced in his ne-
gotiations either by fear or partial-
ity for the Americans. In combatting 
this twofold accusation it was impor-
tant that he should show the political 
and physical strength of the United 
States, that he should demonstrate the 
impossibility of defending the Spanish 
provinces in America, and that he 
should draw such a picture of the peo-
ple as might lead to the inference 
that contempt, rather than admiration 
or dread, supplied him with the color-
ing. It will be seen from the ingen-
uity with which he has managed his ar-
. gumentsi· that Don Luis de Onis was a 
wily po itician, and a master of the 
diplomatic art ••• •" 
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